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ABSTRACT
OLEG GREDIL: Market-timing and Agency Costs:
Evidence from Private Equity.
(Under the direction of Gregory W. Brown)
Private equity (PE) funds operate at the interface of private and public capital markets. This
paper investigates whether PE fund managers have private information about the valuations of
publicly traded securities. Using a dataset of cash flows from 941 buyout and venture funds,
I show that PE funds’ distribution patterns predict returns of public securities in the industries
of the funds’ specialization, but fund managers tend to sell at the market peaks only when they
have performance fees to harvest. I find that the cost of this agency tension increases in the
manager’s survival risk and that the managers’ knowledge pertains to the public firms’ future
earnings rather than the discount-rates. My tests distinguish market-timing from reactions to
the variation in risk premia and spillover effects of PE activity on public firms. The results help
better understand PE performance and have strong implications for PE manager selection. It
follows that PE activity embeds private information into the prices of public securities.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Although by their nature private equity (PE) funds invest in private companies, their per-
formance often depends crucially on the interface with public capital markets. Whether or not
the fund’s exit (or entry) involves a public transaction, comparable public market valuations
affect the price. Prior research shows that PE managers are causing changes in policies of
the investee companies as well as the industries in which these companies operate in, while
being highly responsive to conditions in capital markets.1 Yet, there is little evidence of how
informed PE managers are about the valuations of public equities and what role this informa-
tion plays in their investment outcomes. In this paper, I examine whether PE managers can
really buy low and sell high. I rely on the agency of PE intermediation to identify a private
information-based market-timing from the alternative explanations. Since the counterfactual
with market-timing actions is relatively observable, I am also able to quantify some agency
costs of delegated money management. My results suggest that expected flows from future
funds restrain managers from “destroying value” (consistent with the theoretical framework of
Chung et al., 2011), but they fall short of inducing enough incentives.
Participation in private equity funds requires the investors (the limited partners, or LPs) to
provide a pre-specified amount of cash over a multi-year period on short notice. The schedule
of these outlays is ex-ante unknown and determined by the managers of the funds (the general
partners, or GPs). In addition to fixed fees, GPs receive performance fees (carried-interest),
1For example, see Bernstein, Lerner, Sørensen and Stro¨mberg (2011) and Aldatmaz (2012) for the spillover
effects on the industry-wide corporate policies and efficiency; see Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein
(2008), Axelson, Jenkinson, Stro¨mberg, and Weisbach (2010), Ball, Chiu, and Smith (2011) for the reactions to
market conditions.
a fraction of the fund life-time profits, and decide when to return capital to LPs.2 Such a
near-absence of control over the timing of investments and divestments on the part of investors
distinguishes the private equity funds from other forms of delegated asset management. The
ceding of contribution and distribution timing to PE managers is commonly viewed as nec-
essary given that PE funds hold non-traded assets. Yet, the delegation of these rights is also
perceived as a source of liquidity risk for LPs. Recent studies have shown that GPs may be
extracting agency benefits from these control rights over the fund cash-flow schedule.3
Less understood is the potential benefit to LPs of ceding these cash-flow timing rights.4 GPs
specialize in certain types of businesses, know as much as the companies’ management and,
at the same time, have a first-hand read on the portfolio demands of financial and corporate
investors.5 Consequently, in this analysis I empirically focus on two closely-related issues.
First, I examine if PE managers have an informational advantage relative to public market
prices. I show that PE managers do appear to learn valuable private information about the
valuation of certain public equities and that the potential gains to LPs of delegating cash-
flow timing decisions to GPs can outweigh illiquidity costs. The economic magnitude of the
effect is large. An inter-quartile increase in the rate of funds’ distributions to investors predicts
approximately 6% lower 12-month returns for the fund’s primary S&P500 sector.
Second, I examine the effects of the agency relationship between LPs and GPs. I show that
unless GPs have “skin-in-the-game” via positive performance fees to harvest, they appear to
not be using their private information to exit the fund investments near the market peaks while
2Despite a large degree of flexibility, distributions are subject to contractual limits on the fund life which are
typically 10 to 13 years since inception. While the period of possible capital outlays from investors is largely
limited to the first 5 years since fund inception.
3See Robinson and Sensoy (2013), Phalippou (2009), Degeorge, Martin, and Phalippou (2013).
4PE fund managers oversee operations of dozens of companies. In comparison to most investors in public
companies, PE managers are relatively unrestricted in information sharing with the companies’ managers.
5The potential counterparties include professionally managed pools of capital (both, private and public) as
well as non-financial firms with strategic interests in certain output producing assets. Even attempts to raise a
follow-on fund may be informative about the exit prospects for the existing fund holdings.
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not delivering better holding-period abnormal returns either.6 I also show that GPs with a good
market-timing track record, but nonetheless facing a particularly high survival risk (beyond the
current fund term), are more likely to delay distributions to LPs when industry return volatility
is about to rise.7 In these situations, GPs may decrease distributions because they own out-
of-the-money options on the current and future funds’ assets, and increasing industry volatility
makes these options more valuable. These results contribute to the growing literature on private
equity governance and, more broadly, on optimal contracting.8
I conduct my analysis using a sample of 941 U.S.-focused buyout and venture funds in-
cepted between 1979 and 2006. The data comes from the Burgiss database of private equity
funds that previous studies have found to be representative of the universe that has been avail-
able for institutional investors.9 Besides the precise amounts and dates of capital calls and
distributions for each fund, I observe quarterly net asset values as well as various characteris-
tics including GP-affiliation and the industry of specialization. My research design examines
public market return (mean and variance) predictability as a function of the relative size and
timing of PE fund distributions while accounting for the time-varying supply of mature funds
(i.e., those with portfolio companies that are ready for exits). Using difference-in-difference
tests, I disentangle the industry timing skills of GPs from alternative explanations such as time-
varying exit conditions or causal effects of PE activity on the public companies.
The key identifying assumption is that alternative explanations to the timing skill (or the
6Normally, performance fees in PE are subject to a claw-back if the fund’s remaining assets value decreases.
Meanwhile, early exits may reduce the amount of asset management and monitoring fees that GPs collect from
the fund, and also forgo a chance to improve the performance rank amongst peer-funds.
7These results obtain through the simulation-based estimation which controls for vintage-X-industry variation
as well as other GP-specific and fund-specific attributes.
8For example, Barrot (2012) finds that remaining fund life determines the type of venture fund investments
which can run counter to LPs’ objectives. Degeorge, Martin and Phalippou (2013) find evidence consistent with
GPs “going-for-broke” with secondary buyout investments. On the other hand, the results in Fang, Ivashina, and
Lerner (2014) suggest that GPs intermediation might not be as costly. The authors find essentially no outper-
formance of private investments implemented by LPs directly while the co-investments run by GPs significantly
underperform.
9See Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2013).
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existence relevant private information) do not depend on the changes in a GP’s own wealth
exposure to the industry valuations. I verify this assumption via a series of placebo tests and
event studies. Consistent with the private information hypothesis, returns predictability from
fund cash flows vanishes outside of the industries in which the GPs specialize and relates
to the industry aggregate earnings news. I develop a new metric of GP’s cash-flow Timing
Track Record that contains valuable information about a fund’s future propensity to sell close
to industry highs and buy around lows. Consistent with the predictability being related to
GP skill, these market-timing track records appear to be just as important a signal as financial
incentives. To examine the robustness of my results and remove potentially confounding effects
in my primary tests, I conduct simulations that allow for a better control for variation in exit
conditions (e.g., time-varying expected returns by industry). The inference is robust to errors
clustered in calendar-time, as well as to exclusions of particularly dramatic market episodes
and certain fund groups.
While this paper is the first to directly examine the relation between PE manager private
information and public market returns, there exists anecdotal and indirect evidence consistent
with market-timing ability of PE managers (or, at least, efforts thereof).10 In a survey of 79
buyout firms by Gompers, Kaplan and Mukharlyamov (2014), “facilitating a high value exit”
is among the top three ways buyout funds seek to create value. Recently, prominent private eq-
uity firms have launched actively managed mutual funds citing their private investing expertise
as a managerial advantage.11 Yet, to-date there is no direct evidence supporting the PE pri-
vate information-based market-timing hypothesis, clear of the alternative explanations which
notably confound the economic implications of the results.12
10Anecdotal evidence of positive informational spillovers from investing in private companies includes exam-
ples of successful public “stock pickers” that heavily invest in private companies: Warren Buffet of Berkshire
Hathaway, Charles Coleman of Tiger Global, among many others.
11For example, see “Following KKR, Blackstone Chases Retail With Mutual Fund”, Forbes, 07/16/2013.
12Lerner (1994), Kalpan and Stro¨mberg (2008), Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song (2011) do not disentangle private
information-based market-timing from reacting to the observable exit condition variation, time-varying expected
returns, and causal effects of PE activities on the public company valuations.
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My findings suggest that an LP’s choice of a fund manager should incorporate a GP’s
market-timing track record since the expected gains persist across funds by the same GP and
are of the same order of magnitude as private equity illiquidity costs.13 However, to the extent
a given GP is at risk of not raising a next fund (e.g., due to lack of a long-term reputation),
the expected gains from market-timing decreases and may turn negative as the probability of
the aforementioned “asset-hoarding” increases. Provided that some GPs’ market-timing skill
would therefore require lower (or higher) liquidity premium for the funds they manage, my
analysis speaks to a few important questions in the investments literature: (i) why investors
choose to allocate to PE, (ii) how they select GPs, and (iii) what contract they have with a
particular GP.
As per Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan (2013), the data indicate that in large samples, both
buyout and venture funds on average outperform public markets (on the holding period basis).
My findings suggest that the portfolio abnormal performance attributable to PE is likely even
better in aggregate, given the additional value from market-timing.14 However, the returns on
a strategy of picking the best PE managers from the past might be diminishing as suggested
by Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan and Stucke (2013) as well as by Sensoy, Wang, and Weisbach
(2013). Both studies find less persistence in holding period returns by GPs and LPs than in
earlier samples.15 Thus, I contribute to the understanding of why LPs may still prefer PE fund
managers with the best past track records even if holding periods returns of their funds are not
much different from those run by less established competitors.16
13Franzoni, Nowak, and Phalippou (2012) and Sørensen, Wang, and Yang (2014) using very different ap-
proaches estimate the illiquidity costs for PE to be 2-3% per annum. However, neither of the studies consider
the cash-flow timing dimension of fund returns. Similarly in Ang, Chen, Goetzmann and Phalippou (2013), pri-
vate equity time-varying abnormal returns capture only the portfolio company selection and nurturing effects (i.,
holding period returns).
14Even without active management on the part of an LP, private equity fund distributions near industry peaks
induces fluctuations in portfolio weights that result in higher Sharpe-ratios for the LP. Meanwhile, LPs may also
consider optimizing allocations in their public equity portfolio based on the signals from the private equity part.
15See Kaplan and Schoar (2005), and Lerner, Schoar, and Wang (2007).
16For example, LPs may do so because (1) they learn more market-timing signals from such GPs; (2) this
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The results in this paper also imply broader roles for private equity in the modern capi-
tal markets. In settings such as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), GPs’ learning through private
investing constitutes a “costly arbitrage” that improves the informational efficiency of public
markets. For example, the tech-bubble of the late 1990s might have gotten greater if not for
the flood of private equity exits trying to preempt (the GPs’ carried interest being hit by) the
bust. Specifically, venture funds incepted between 1995 and 1998 have divested considerably
more than invested during the later stage of the NASDAQ boom. Even for the funds with not
fully drawn capital commitments as of the beginning of 1999, the ratio of total distributions to
capital calls during the following 12 months was 7-to-1.17 This fact is hard to reconcile with a
popular wisdom that venture capitalists’ activity tends to amplify the valuation cycle.18
The dissertation proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 provides pre-
liminary evidence of the market-timing skill presence among private equity GPs and motivates
the hypotheses development and methods choice in Section 4 which also reviews the related
literature. Section 5 reports main results. Section 6 concludes. Additional details, robustness
and placebo tests are in the Appendix.
reduces the ex-ante probability of their GPs having difficulty with raising a follow-on fund and, thus, the afore-
mentioned risk-shifting incentives.
17While the same ratio for the funds specializing in Internet Technology was in excess of 9-to-1.
18For example, see “Venture capital funding soars to levels last seen in dot-com bubble” by Chris O’Brien, Los
Angeles Times, April 18, 2014.
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2 DATA
Private equity data for this study come from Burgiss, a leading provider of portfolio man-
agement software, services, and analytics to private capital investors. The dataset is sourced
exclusively from about 300 investors in private capital funds (LPs) that collectively have made
over 20,000 fund commitments, and includes the complete cash flow and valuation history with
these funds1 The underlying LP universe consists of approximately 60% pension funds (a mix
of public and private), 20% endowments and 20% other investors (such as sovereign wealth
funds and funds-of funds).2 Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2013) compare several private eq-
uity datasets and conclude that the Burgiss dataset is representative of the buyout and venture
funds investable universe.
I limit the sample to U.S.-focused buyout and venture funds with more than 25 and 10 mil-
lion in capital commitments (respectively) incepted between 1979-2006. In total, the sample
includes 349 (592) buyout (venture) funds of which 126 (169) continue operations as of March
2013. For each fund I observe: (1) the primary industry sector according to Global Indus-
try Classification Standard (henceforth industry); (2) the amount of capital committed; (3) the
strategy description; (4) the dated amounts of cash inflows and outflows as well as Net Asset
Values (NAVs) reported quarterly.3
Panel A of Table 2.1 reports basic summary statistics for buyout and venture subsamples.
1Thus, the sample does not include co-investments or direct private investments studied in Fung et al.(2014).
2The dataset maintains confidentiality by removing all names and identifications.
3The cash-flow information is net of all fees allowing for accurate computation of returns to LPs. I do not
know the gross-of-fees performance of investments, nor the fee terms. Fortunately, the only contractual term
essential for my tests, the minimum rate of return to LPs beyond which GPs start to earn carry, has almost no
variation within fund type according to other studies. For example, see Metric and Yasuda (2010), Robinson and
Sensoy (2013). For buyouts (venture) funds this “hurdle rate” is almost always 8 (0) percent.
The results suggest high within-type variation in fund life duration, size, and returns.4 85%
of funds are affiliated with a private equity firm (GPs) with multiple funds. For these funds, I
observe the fund’s chronological order (by inception date) within GP and GP-industry.5 Thus,
the median fund in the dataset is the second by a GP and within a given industry while about
a quarter of funds are fourth or higher in a sequence. Mature venture GPs are somewhat less
likely to operate in multiple industries, unlike those specializing in buyouts.
4Returns are as of the last cash flow or valuation date in the sample.
5Where GPs’ affiliation is absent, I impute zero for Overall and Industry Sequence.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the data used in this study. Panel A reports sequence order, vintage year,
life since inception, size, and the last-most performance statistics for 349 (592) U.S.-focused buyout (venture)
funds of which 126 (169) continue operations as of March 2013. Overall and Industry Sequence report the fund
chronological order of the inception date within GP and GP-industry respectively or zeros when fund’s GP data
is not available ( 15% of sample funds). IRR stands for internal rate of return. PME vs Market (Industry) denotes
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) Public Market Equivalent Index versus broad market (S&P500 subindex corresponding
to the GICS Industry Sector of the fund specialty). Panel B reports statistics for monthly returns, price-to-earning-
and book-to-market-ratios of these subindexes for the period from January 1989 through October 2013. Panel C
reports statistics for the rest of the variables as described in Section 4.2.
Panel A: Private Equity Funds
Variable Mean SD p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
B
uy
ou
t
Overall Sequence 3.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 12.0
Industry Sequence 2.1 1.7 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 6.0 8.0
Vintage Year 1996 5 1982 1986 1994 1997 2000 2003 2005
Life in Quarters 48 11 20 30 41 48 55 65 81
Fund Size ($mln) 745 955 25 60 160 400 910 2920 5000
IRR 0.165 0.227 -0.195 -0.077 0.060 0.130 0.225 0.488 1.017
Money Multiple 13.32 181.21 0.52 1.00 1.69 2.28 3.44 8.69 51.92
PME vs Market 1.34 0.92 0.29 0.51 0.90 1.22 1.61 2.29 3.87
PME vs Industry 1.34 0.87 0.26 0.48 0.87 1.24 1.63 2.48 3.08
Ve
nt
ur
e
Overall Sequence 3.1 2.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 13.0
Industry Sequence 2.7 2.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 11.0
Vintage Year 1993 6 1980 1982 1987 1994 1999 2001 2003
Life in Quarters 49 11 23 33 42 49 56 68 78
Fund Size ($mln) 156 178 11 19 47 98 190 510 850
IRR 0.227 0.524 -0.248 -0.155 0.004 0.094 0.222 1.107 2.735
Money Multiple 4.42 6.49 0.36 0.78 1.69 2.69 4.33 13.74 37.65
PME vs Market 1.46 2.13 0.12 0.25 0.59 0.94 1.39 3.99 12.40
PME vs Industry 1.38 1.69 0.13 0.32 0.62 0.99 1.45 3.68 10.22
Panel B: Industry Benchmarks
GICS Sector Returns Book-to-Market Price-to-Earnings
Mean SD Skew Mean p25 p75 Mean p25 p75
Consumer Discre-
tionary
0.009 0.052 -0.737 0.379 0.319 0.438 27.0 15.7 22.9
Consumer Staples 0.009 0.040 -1.047 0.238 0.178 0.291 20.1 15.9 21.1
Energy 0.010 0.053 -0.397 0.438 0.358 0.521 17.6 12.4 19.4
Financials 0.007 0.065 -0.984 0.629 0.467 0.840 24.6 12.8 17.7
Healthcare 0.010 0.047 -0.461 0.247 0.165 0.320 20.0 15.9 21.3
Industrials 0.009 0.046 -1.107 0.323 0.283 0.369 23.3 16.7 27.2
Internet Technology 0.008 0.072 -0.796 0.327 0.224 0.451 27.5 15.2 35.6
Materials 0.008 0.057 -0.627 0.424 0.359 0.460 23.6 14.8 28.4
Telecommunications 0.007 0.055 -0.402 0.406 0.280 0.509 21.0 15.6 23.0
Utilities 0.008 0.044 -0.616 0.554 0.484 0.678 15.2 12.3 16.7
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Panel C: Other Variables
Variable Mean SD p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
Market Return (*100) 0.92 4.58 -10.22 -7.60 -1.74 1.52 3.93 7.66 10.20
CAY Ratio (*100) 0.26 2.28 -3.35 -3.13 -2.04 0.52 2.25 3.46 3.96
CBOE VIX 20.7 7.8 11.1 11.8 15.3 19.4 24.1 35.1 46.4
BBB-AAA spread 0.99 0.40 0.55 0.60 0.75 0.91 1.16 1.46 3.00
AAA-UST spread 1.32 0.48 0.49 0.71 0.90 1.24 1.69 2.12 2.53
10-year yield (*100) 5.55 2.01 1.68 1.98 4.10 5.50 7.17 8.86 9.26
3-month yield (*100) 3.69 2.41 0.02 0.05 1.33 4.34 5.40 7.69 8.43
Figure 2.1 demonstrates high variation in fund cash-flow schedules for both buyout and
venture funds. As shown in Panel A, a quarter of buyout funds call 61% or less of committed
capital by the 30th month since inception while another quarter are fully invested by that time.
Distributions from buyout funds are even more variable. Among buyout funds, a quarter had
40% of total distributions completed 30 months prior to resolution whereas another quarter
had over 80% distributed.6 Panel B reports similar charts for venture funds and indicates even
wider variation in both contributions and distributions.
I utilize the CRSP value-weighted index as a proxy for public market equity returns. For
equity industry returns, I use returns on S&P500 industry sectors because these map directly
to the classification in the Burgiss data and represent widely-followed benchmarks by practi-
tioners.7 The list of industries and summary statistics for monthly total returns, price-earnings
and book-to-market ratios from January 1989 through September 2013 are reported in Panel B
of Table 2.1. Panel A of Table 2.1 also reports the PME measure of market-adjusted fund per-
formance as described by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), as well as a similar indicator calculated
against the industry benchmark PME vs. Industry.8 Summary statistics for other variables of
6I define “resolution” as funds older than 5 years since inception with remaining NAV ≤ 1% of fund size.
7Results are similar if I use industry subindexes of the S&P600 (small capitalization stocks).
8S&P500 returns were used in place of sector returns in periods before 1989.
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Figure 2.1: Private Equity Fund Cash-flows: Cross-Section
This figure reports the 5th, 25th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for the fraction of to-date capital calls (distributions) in
the total amount eventually to be called (distributed) by each fund during the first (last) 60 months of its operation.
Panel A plots results for the buyout subsample. For example, according to the left-chart, a quarter of buyout funds
by the 30th month since inception would call 61% of its capital or less while another quarter would be fully
invested by that time. From the right-chart we learn that among almost fully resolved buyout funds, a quarter
had about 40% of total distributions completed 30 months before last while another quarter had over 80% already
distributed. Panel B reports this analysis for the venture subsample.
Panel A: Buyout
Panel B: Venture
interest are reported in Table 2.1 Panel C. CAY Ratio is the cointegrated consumption-wealth
ratio from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001). VIX is the CBOE volatility index for the S&P500.
BBB-AAA spread and AAA-UST spread are, respectively, difference between Moody’s Baa and
Aaa yields, and Aaa yield and 10-year constant maturity U.S. Treasury yield, 10-year yield.
3-month yield is the U.S. Treasury bill rate.
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3 A SIMPLE MEASURE OF GPS’ MARKET TIMING
The information that a GP obtains through the investment cycle and public markets valu-
ations are closely related.1 Public markets prices reflect cash flow expectations and investor
preferences while also affecting the fund’s investment entry and exit prices, regardless of the
deal sourcing and exit route. As an example, consider an exit through a sale to a public corpora-
tion. Bargaining over price would normally evolve around an assortment of valuation ratios of
comparable publicly traded firms as indications of a fair price, even though the business char-
acteristics might not exactly match those of the target company. Thus, GPs may be able to take
advantage of superior knowledge of industry trends even when the fund portfolio companies
have, in fact, relatively small exposures to these trends.
The ability of GPs to act on company-specific information advantage is likely to be lim-
ited by adverse-selection concerns of the prospective buyers. A need to make concessions
with regards to idiosyncratic returns would be consistent with buyout- and venture-backed
IPO outperformance, particularly against characteristics-matched portfolios, as documented in
Brav and Gompers (1997), Cao and Lerner (2006), and Harford and Kolasinski (2013). How-
ever, this adverse selection is much less relevant with regards to industry-wide risk realizations
since those who typically buy from (sell to) private equity funds care more about the relative
performance of the asset, not absolute performance as do private equity GPs.2 In general, GPs
informational advantage should dissipate beyond the industry of specialization.
I begin my analysis with suggestive evidence that GP access to information relevant to
1A detailed discussion of the institutional details supporting this statement is provided in Appendix A.1.
2GPs receive a fixed fee of 1-2% of fund size over the course of its contractual life and typically 20% of the
fund absolute profits if they exceed a predetermined threshold. See Metric and Yasuda (2009), Robinson and
Sensoy (2013) for details.
industry valuations manifests in PE fund cash flows. To analyze the timing track records and
obtain a proxy for a presence of such a skill, I propose a measure of a gross return over a
fund’s life-time due to selling at market highs and buying at market lows. Computationally it
is very similar to the Public Market Equivalent (PME) of Kaplan and Schoar (2005). However,
the Timing Track Record (henceforth TTR) measures the timing component of a fund’s total
returns that PME explicitly disregards. Specifically, I define,
TTR =
PME
PME
=
∑T
t=1Dte
r1,T ·(1−t/T )/
∑T
1 Cte
r1,T ·(1−t/T )∑T
t=1Dte
rt,T/
∑T
1 Cte
rt,T
(3.1)
where rt,T is the market return from the cash flow date (t) until the fund’s resolution (T),
while Dt(Ct) denotes the fund’s distributions (capital calls). In essence, TTR is a ratio of
two profitability indexes with different discount rates. The discount rates in the denominator
reflect investment periods opportunity costs while the discount rates in the numerator reflects
the commitment period opportunity costs. Thus, a TTR value above one indicates that the NPV
is greater if measured against the fund commitment period opportunity cost. In other words, a
TTR greater than one is consistent with value-added from the market-timing by GP. 3 Just as
PME, TTR can be computed on a to-date basis by assuming the respective period to be the last
and the NAV at that date to be a liquidating distribution. See Brown, Gredil, and Kaplan (2013)
for to-date-PME definitions. Importantly, the mean market return for PME computation will
also be last date specific.
To better understand the intuition behind TTR, consider the following stylized example.
Two funds, A and B, start at the same time with $30 in committed capital and have to 2 years
to invest. Both funds liquidate at year 4. For simplicity we assume that neither fund has
portfolio company selection skill and so earns the market rate of return on investments, thus
3Also, ln(TTR)/FundDuration can be viewed as the annual rate of timing alpha.
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PME=1.0 for both funds by definition. However, fund A chooses to draw capital in equal
installments over 3 years whereas fund B, correctly anticipating a market downturn, draws less
capital initially.
Entry Timing Example
Year rmkt Fund A Cash Flow Fund B Cash Flow Fund A NAVs
0 - -10 -5 10
1 5.0% -10 -5 20.50 =10·1.05+10
2 -13.6% -10 -20 27.71
3 5.0% 0 0 29.09
4 5.0% 30.55 31.81 0
PME 1.00 1.00
PME 1.02 =30.55/30 1.06 =31.81/30
TTR = PME/PME 1.02 =1.02/1.00 1.06 =1.06/1.00
While both funds have PME equal to one, fund B creates more value for its LPs than fund
A: 1.81 versus 0.55. This added value is reflected in a higher PME for fund B and thus a
higher TTR for fund B. In this way TTR measures the market timing ability of the managers
of fund B. Appendix A.2 provides examples with more realistic cash flows and market returns
that show how TTR captures the timing of exits as well.
The money-multiple (i.e., ratio of nominal distributions to contributions) is an absolute per-
formance measure widely utilized by practitioners and would reflect the difference in returns
to LPs from funds A and B. In fact, the money-multiples of A and B are 1.02 and 1.06, respec-
tively. In this specific case, they are the same as TTRs because the cumulative market return
is zero and the PME of each fund is 1.0. However, in practice money-multiples also reflect
differences in market returns over fund lives, as well as differences in fund holding period ab-
normal returns. Thus, Equation (3.1) essentially strips-out the prevailing market trend from the
money-multiple and deflates it by the gross life-time return due to portfolio companies’ selec-
tion (and nurturing) effects. In addition to its simplicity, TTR also benefits from a robustness
14
to risk misspecification by virtue of its relation to PME. 4 Specifically, risk-related errors will
tend to cancel out in TTR because PME will have beta-related estimation errors positively
correlated with those in PME.
Panel A of Figure 3.1 plots distributions of end-of-life TTRs for the sample funds against
the broad market and the respective fund industry, separately for buyout and venture subsam-
ples. First, the dispersion of TTR is comparable with that of PME, suggesting that TTR is
indeed a potentially important dimension of fund performance. Second, the means are statis-
tically different from one and are larger for the industry benchmark case albeit the distances
are economically small, corresponding to average industry timing alpha of about 1% per year
since inception.5 Nonetheless, almost a third of funds in both subsamples have a TTR of 1.18 or
higher which exceeds the 2% per year “break-even” alpha estimates in Sørensen et al.(2013).
Panel B of Figure 3.1 plots to-date TTRs as of the 5th anniversary against the end-of-life
TTRs (for funds that exist at least 9 years). By the 5th year TTR would tend to reflect mostly the
entry timing. Examples in Figure A.2 suggest that bad exit timing can offset the effect of the
entry and vice versa. Nonetheless, from Panel B it appears that funds that have a good timing
track record as of mid-life normally continue to do so through the remainder of their lives and,
thus, tend to exhibit good exit timing.
Panel A of Table 3.1 reports associations of industry TTRs with GP characteristics that
proxy for institutional quality.6 Fund size (size-squared) is positively (negatively) related to
end-of-life TTR. However, the size effect is insignificant when temporal variation is controlled
for through vintage year fixed effects. Fund sequence is positively related to TTR computed
using industry returns indicating that funds raised by GPs with more experience in a given
industry are likely to better navigate industry peaks and troughs. These results are not present
4See Korteweg and Nagel (2013) and Sørensen and Jagannathan (2013) for details. Robinson and Sensoy
(2011) provide empirical assessment of the question by examining sensitivity of cross-sectional mean PME to
different beta/benchmark assumption).
5Since TTR is limited by the benchmark volatility over the period, Sharpe-ratios may be more comparable
across time and industries.
6See, for example, Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Robinson and Sensoy (2011).
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Figure 3.1: Timing Track Records: Sample Funds
This figure plots Timing Track Record (TTR) values for the sample private equity funds. TTR is defined in Section
3 and measures the gross-return due to selling near the market peaks during the fund life-time and buying near
the troughs. Panel A plots univariate distributions. Top-left (right) chart shows TTRs against the broad market
index for the buyout (venture) funds, while bottom-left (right) charts shows TTRs for the respective subsample
against (S&P500 subindex of) GICS industry sector that the respective fund specializes in (Industry TTRs). Panel
B compares end-of-5th-year and final Industry TTRs values for the buyout (venture) subsamples of funds that
were for at least 9 years old.
Panel A: End-of-Life Values
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for broad market returns reported in Panel B.
Table 3.1: Timing Track Record: Associations and Persistence
This table reports linear regression model estimates of the log of funds’ end-life TTRs. TTR is defined in Section
3 and measures the gross-return due to selling near the market peaks during the fund life-time and buying near
the troughs. The explanatory variables are: ln(Size)i (ln(Size)2i ) - log (log-squared) of the fund $ capital
committed; ln(Sequence)i - chronological order of the fund inception date by given GPs (the private equity
management firm); ln(PME)i - log of the fund’s Kaplan and Schoar (2005) Public Market Equivalent Index;
ln(TTR)i−1 - log of the GP’s previous fund TTR. In Panel A TTR, ln(Sequence)i and PME are measured with
respect to the GICS Industry Sector of the fund specialty while in Panel B - versus the broad market/ all funds by
given GPs. Specifications (2) through (6) include fund vintage-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by GPs, */**/*** denote significance at 10/5/1% confidence level.
Panel A: TTR versus Industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Size)i 0.515*** 0.082
(0.162) (0.150)
ln(Size)2i −0.014*** −0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
ln(IndSequence)i 0.057*** 0.049*** 0.040** 0.055**
(0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.024)
ln(PME)i 0.040*** 0.059*** 0.054***
(0.015) (0.020) (0.020)
ln(TTR)i−1 0.135** 0.115** 0.107**
(0.052) (0.051) (0.049)
Vintage FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 756 756 756 404 404 404
R2 0.025 0.387 0.386 0.431 0.449 0.457
Panel B: TTR versus Broad Market
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Size)i 0.164* 0.002
(0.085) (0.072)
ln(Size)2i −0.005** −0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
ln(Sequence)i 0.048*** 0.034*** 0.015* 0.011
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
ln(PME)i 0.037*** 0.044*** 0.043***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
ln(TTR)i−1 0.108** 0.093* 0.093*
(0.055) (0.049) (0.050)
Vintage FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 756 756 756 404 404 404
R2 0.035 0.468 0.482 0.470 0.516 0.517
One may suspect that market-timing is a substitute for GP skills required to select and
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nurture fund portfolio companies. The positive coefficients for PME in specifications (3), (5)
and (6) suggest the opposite: funds with good “selection and nurturing” skills, as measured
by PME, tend to also be better at timing the industry cycles. Specifications (4) through (6) in
Table 3.1 show a positive relation between a GP’s previous fund’s TTR and the current fund’s
TTR. This is evidence that timing ability is persistent at the GP level. The fact that all of these
relations are uniformly weaker when timing is measured against the broad market benchmark
(Panel B of Table 3.1) is consistent with greater timing ability by GPs at the industry level. 7
In summary, this section has developed a simple but potentially powerful measure of GP
market timing ability. Timing ability appears to have significant positive value to LPs. Further-
more, it appears more related to industry returns than to market returns and is persistent at the
GP level. I now turn to a more detailed discussion of hypotheses, development of empirical
tests, and a discussion of results.
7Panel A of Table A.1 reports similar regressions but with additional control variables that proxy for possible
measurement errors in TTRs driven by systematic risk’s misspecification: industry return over the fund life-time
and its interactions with the respective variable(s) of interest. The results appear largely unchanged from those in
Panel A of Table 3.1. The only meaningfully different coefficient is that on PME suggesting that the correlations
between TTR and PME may indeed arise spuriously (yet unlikely to be as large). Same conclusion follows from
Panel B of Table A.1 where I simulate random exits for actual fund operation dates and industry return paths
across different fund risk assumptions. The tests of conditional correlations between past TTRs and future PMEs,
as described in Section 5.5.1.1, shall be free of this concern though.
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4 HYPOTHESES AND METHODS
4.1 Related Literature
The question of market timing by private owners connects to a large body of literature on
initial public offerings (IPOs) and mergers and acquisition (M&A) waves in the context of
either adverse selection (signalling) problems or some form of investor irrationality.1 How-
ever, there are few studies of market timing track records of institutional money managers that
specialize in investing in private companies with an explicit horizon for exit.
Lerner (1994) examines the choices of venture-backed biotech firms to raise capital by
IPO or through private financing during 1978-92. He concludes that venture capitalists can
time the market by issuing before the sector declines and that experienced VCs appear more
skilled in this way. More recently, Ball, Chiu, and Smith (2011) argue that the biotech sample-
period of Lerner (1994) was anomalous. Using data on 3,477 IPOs and 4,486 acquisitions
of venture-backed companies over 1978-2009, they find evidence consistent with firms react-
ing to favorable exit conditions (“pseudo-timing”) rather than attempting to take advantage of
investor over-optimism. This conclusion is based on the lack of evidence that IPOs precede
negative market/sector return as well as IPO returns being statistically lower than those after
exits through M&A. Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2008) summarize empirical evidence consistent
with buyout GPs taking advantage of market timing, including the relative (mis)pricing be-
tween debt and equity. Combining the results of Kaplan and Stein (1993), Axelson et al.(2010)
and Guo et al.(2011), the authors report expansion of the industry capital-to-cash-flow ratios
1Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that the new issues in the low IPO volume periods perform
better than those in the high-volume periods. Baker and Wurgler(2000) document evidence consistent with oppor-
tunistic market timing by firms as a higher fraction of equity in aggregate issuance preceded periods of low market
returns. Lowry (2003) focuses on the role of asymmetric information and concludes that adverse selection costs,
although statistically significant, are economically small in front of “demands for capital and investor sentiment”.
as an important driver of the mean absolute returns for the sample of buyout deals undertaken
in 1980-2006. Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2008) also elaborate on much higher responsiveness of
buyout leverage to the credit market conditions as opposed to that of public corporations which
may point to GPs’ ability to capitalize on apparent debt mispricing.2
4.1.1 Pseudo-timing
There are two alternative explanations to the market timing skill of GPs that are also con-
sistent with PE funds TTR exceeding one and persisting (as per Section 3). First, GPs do not
have any superior information but a rush-to-exit reflects the variation in broad market and in-
dustry condition for exits, consistent with rational (yet uninformed) behavior models of Schultz
(2003) and Pastor and Veronesi (2005).3 Following Ball et al.(2011), I refer to this alternative
as Pseudo-timing.4 Simply put, a “sell after market run-ups” trading rule can be implemented
without the costly help of the agent.
In fact, such investment timing by GPs may even generate utility losses to LPs since asset
valuations may reflect time-varying risk premia. One way to conceptualize this possibility is
with the notion of cash flow liquidity risks that LPs have to bear (e.g., with regards to yet
undrawn commitments that may not be offset by the distributions from other funds in the
portfolio). The cash squeeze that many endowments and pension funds endured in the 2008
financial crisis has sparked a research interest in liquidity premia appropriate for private equity
investing.5
It is important to realize that gains from Pseudo-timing do not provide a compensation
2Recently, Ang, Chen, Goetzmann and Phalippou (2013) reconfirm this capital market segmentation hypoth-
esis having extracted the private equity time-varying excess return from pools of fund cash-flows via a Bayesian
MCMC estimation.
3Schultz (2003) demonstrates that mean-reversion coupled with a decision rule of issuing after market run-ups
would be observationally similar to informed trading. Pastor and Veronesi (2005) develop a model of “rational IPO
waves” where issuance volume varies endogenously as a function of market conditions without any overreactions
by investors or differences in cash-flow signal precisions.
4Although we adjust the TTR numerator for the fund lifetime mean market return, it generally does not equal
the expected market return in each period.
5For example, see Franzoni, Nowak, and Phalippou (2012), and Sørensen, Wang, and Yang (2014)
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for these risks. To see this, consider an extension of the Merton portfolio choice framework
that encompasses liquid and illiquid risky assets as per Ang, Papanikolau, and Westerfield
(2011).6 The authors model illiquidity as the stochastic arrival of trading opportunities so
that immediate consumption can only be financed with liquid wealth (either risky or risk-free
asset). The likelihood of a suboptimally high weight of the illiquid risky asset in states of
high marginal utility of consumption causes lower target allocations to risky assets overall and
the illiquid one (i.e. private equity) specifically. Therefore, if private equity weights were to
increase in these high marginal utility states (i.e. as a result of Pseudo-timing), the equilibrium
expected returns required to support a given target allocation to the illiquid asset would need
to be higher.7 Hence, to assess the economic value-added from market-timing by GPs, it is
necessary to separate any such gains from the Pseudo-timing alternative.
4.1.2 Footprints of PE Activity
The second group of alternative explanations pertain to the causal effect of private equity
fund operations on the behavior of public firms and investors. A number of recent studies
document evidence consistent with the peer firms responding to governance threats by changes
in investing and operating policies.8 In particular, Aldatmaz (2012) finds that private equity
investments cause financial and operating changes in publicly listed firms in the same country-
industry. Thus, it could be that the industry cash flow prospects change because private equity
funds alter their industry participation. I call this Footprint-on-firms.
Both channels, market-timing and Footprint-on-Firms, may give rise to observationally
6The key implications are (i) higher allocation to risk free asset, (ii) low and path-dependent substitutability
between liquid and illiquid assets, (iii) lower post-rebalancing weights of illiquid asset than a long-term optimal
allocation.
7Similarly, private equity distributions in states of low marginal utility of consumption are more likely to be
reinvested in the liquid risky asset which attenuates the positive effect of timely exits (as the avoidance of period
of low market returns).
8See Berstein, Lerner, Sørensen and Stro¨mberg (2011), Aldatmaz (2012) in context of private equity partic-
ipation; Gantchev, Gredil, and Jotikasthira (2013) in context of hedge fund activism. Bernstein et al.(2011) and
Aldatmaz (2012) consider the effect of private equity funds’ participation on the country-industry performance
and find that increases in private equity participation lead to higher productivity and employment growth, contrary
to a popular belief that private equity simply takes away from the surplus of other stakeholders.
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similar event-time patterns. It could be also a Price Distortion. That is, the market price may
temporarily decrease to absorb the increased supply of certain types of assets coming from
admittedly informed investors (i.e., private equity GPs), whereas the industry down-turn fails
to materialize. Note that neither Footprint-on-Firms nor Price Distortion necessarily imply
gains to LPs from GPs’ cashing-in earlier.
4.2 Hypotheses
In light of the discussion above, it is necessary to rely on cross-sectional tests to disentangle
the effect of market-timing and the associated gains to LPs from the alternative explanations.
The traditional route in the literature has been to compare IPO exits with other exits.9 However,
this cross-sectional approach may not be the best for examining GP market-timing ability.
4.2.1 Are non-IPO Exits Informative?
Consider a hypothetical 7-year old buyout fund that has yet to liquidate most of its invest-
ments. Suppose the GP anticipates the industry-wide cash flows will be notably below market
expectations in the near term but healthy in the long-run. Assume there is another fund ap-
proaching the end of its investment period that has yet to deploy its capital. GPs of the second
fund may agree to buy the holdings of the first fund at prices close to publicly-traded compa-
rables. They may in fact do so while fully sharing the belief about an upcoming downturn and
yet still be taking the first-best action from their LPs’ perspective.10 Hence, the exits by the
first fund would be informative of industry return expectations even absent an IPO. Likewise,
corporate buyers may have different investment horizons from that of the seller. Thus, exits
through trade-sale may be as informative about GPs’ expectations as sales through an IPO.
4.2.2 Exploring Agency Costs for Identification
The assumption that GPs take first-best actions for LPs is a strong one. Robinson and
Sensoy (2013) find that PE funds’ distributions cluster too much around “waterfall” dates for
9For example, Lerner (1994), Ball et al. (2011)
10Just the wealth transfer from outside creditors (that overestimate the true collateral value) may exceed how
much the second fund “overpays”. Also, the portfolio company improvement may yet to be fully realized by the
first fund.
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that assumption to be realistic. But, the conditional revelation of the GP’s private signal could
result precisely from the agency relationship. Continuing with the previous example of a 7-year
buyout fund, assume that the fund has performed well enough for GPs to have a substantial
performance fee in that fund. If fund investment value deteriorates at the end of the fund
contractual term (e.g. 10-12 years), the carried interest may vanish too. By rushing to sell the
fund holdings, not only do GPs secure performance fees, but they also lock-in a relatively high
performance rank among peer funds which can help attract investors in future funds.11
In contrast, there is hardly any benefit to GPs from exiting investments before the industry
downturn if the performance to-date is poor. Asset liquidation would amount to suboptimal
early-exercise of an option (to earn carry and improve performance rank) and reduce asset
management fees.12 Therefore, it is possible that skilled GPs facing such a survival risk would
likely seek to retain fund assets ahead of the turbulent times for the same reason that option-
holders want the underlying asset volatility to increase. However, since such an asset hoarding
may tarnish GPs’ reputation with investors and adversely affect future fundraising, one would
expect it to be limited to GPs that face immediate survival risk only (i.e. were unable to raise a
follow-on fund). That would be also consistent with the framework of Chung et al. (2011) as
well as empirical finding by Aragon and Nanda (2011) in hedge funds context.
4.2.3 When Do Exits Convey Less Information?
Suppose that our hypothetical fund has performed very well but already divested its best
deals (i.e. those yielding the highest performance fees). The remaining holdings in the fund’s
portfolio would then likely be comprised of the deals that failed to payout well. Provided that
the fraction of this residual in the total distributions to date is small, its option value (which
increases in the assets idiosyncratic risk as well) may still dominate any expected loss of value
to the fund’s carry amount due to the likely deterioration in the industry-wide factors.
11Chung, Sensoy, Stern, and Weisbach (2011) show that much of GPs’ wealth derives from fees in not yet
raised funds.
12Some funds have the basis for asset management fees switching from committed to invested capital after the
investment period elapses. See Robinson and Sensoy (2013).
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Thus, as the value of the residual fund assets gets small in front of the amount of carry
already cashed-in, the incentive for GPs to reveal a negative market-timing signal diminishes.
Meanwhile, a low pace of distributions over the remainder of the fund’s life is also consistent
with a scenario when GPs have been expecting improvements in the comparable valuations
during that period (i.e., may contain a positive market-timing signal).13
Similarly, the divestments undertaken earlier in the fund’s life, while the residual exposure
of GP’s carried interest has remained high (or very little carry accrued yet), should contain
relatively less of the market-timing consideration. Such differences in the exits motives that
depend on the phase of the funds’ life naturally yield settings for placebo tests.
4.2.4 Potential Power Drains
Even if the incentives to act on the timing signal are in place, the signal may not arrive or
some GPs may not notice it (e.g., because of lower skill). Also, GPs might be too diversified or
could hedge their undesired exposures elsewhere.14 Prior research suggests that persistence in
GP performance is particularly strong in the worst quartile of funds.15 The substantial hetero-
geneity of PE fund returns is a statement about the high total risk of these funds, but also allows
for considerable heterogeneity in GP skill levels. Gervais and Strobl (2012) study the industrial
organization of asset management and show that in equilibrium high-skill and low-skill man-
agers pool into opaque funds, while medium-skill managers separate into transparent funds. It
is hard to find a less transparent example of delegated money management than private equity.
13As industry-wide returns improve (yet remain small in front of the assets’ idiosyncratic returns), the exit
choice will be increasingly driven by positive realizations of the idiosyncratic risks which, by definition, are
uncorrelated across the assets. Hence, the remaining exits would be less clustered in time, all else equal. Equiva-
lently, there will be fewer distributions per unit of time.
14However, finance professionals are often legally prohibited to undertake any personal investing activities
potentially jeopardizing best actions in the interests of clients or their employer. There is little evidence suggesting
how strong and common such clauses are but GP risk-aversion combined with basis risk could also limit these
hedging activities.
15For example, see Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009), Harris et al.(2013a,b).
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4.2.5 Combining Thoughts
The evidence of successful cash-flow timing track records by PE funds presented in Section
3 combined with the discussion in this section yields the following hypotheses:
H1 : PE managers have valuable private information about public equity valuations (i.e., GPs
are Informed).
In other words, some GPs can predict returns of certain public equities because of a superior
information about either future cash-flows of these firms, or investors’ portfolio demands for
such assets, or both. However, in any sample there will be funds that ex-post timed market
peaks and troughs (better than others). Therefore, for a cross-sectional test of this hypothesis
one needs an ex-ante indicator of fund market-timing skill (i.e., to define Informed GPs versus
not). I will use fund TTR-to-date for this purpose and focus on the fund primary industry
valuations which allow for a sharper focus on the learning channel than market-wide returns.
If H1 holds, ceding the cash-flow timing rights to GPs may result in additional benefits to LPs
(or costs). A corollary to H1 is that TTR persists across funds by the same GP as shown in
Table 5.1.
H2 : High rates of fund distributions predicts lower market returns when the value of GP’s
carried interest is at risk.
That is, the benefits of ceding the cash-flow timing rights to GPs are more pronounced
when such actions are more concordant with GPs wealth maximization. A corollary to H2 is
that when a GP is either not Informed or not incentivized, the fund distributions do not pre-
dict market returns. I will proxy for GPs’ carried interest accrual (the “skin in-the-game”)
by levels of the fund net-of-fees performance to date, assuming 0 (8%) hurdle rate for ven-
ture (buyout) funds. If this hypothesis holds, we can conclude that (i) the agency aspect of
the GP-LP relations is important for PE fund performance (possibly even beyond the market-
timing dimension), (ii) nonetheless, LPs should expect the market-timing by GPs to positively
contribute to PE fund returns (to the extent that GPs are expected to earn positive carry).
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H3 : Risk-shifting behavior by an Informed GP is more likely to have an adverse effect on LP
portfolios as compared to risk-shifting behavior of an uninformed GP.
GPs may seek to retain fund assets ahead of elevated market volatility when their survival
is jeopardized. As discussed above, GPs are option-holders that want the underlying asset
volatility to increase. Provided that high volatility is typically associated with low returns, these
actions (when successful) would tend to result in lower Sharpe-ratios for LPs. The question is
whether informed GPs are more successful in correctly predicting such turbulent times in the
industry (while being as incentivized as their uninformed peers). If the answer is yes, informed
GPs will be a drag on LP portfolio performance.
There are two corollaries to hypothesis H3. H3A - when below the performance fee hurdle,
informed GPs create less value to their fund investors through holding period abnormal returns
than uninformed GPs. H3B - informed GPs that have had poor current fund performance but
do not face immediate survival risk are less likely to engage in risk-shifting.
If H3 holds while H2 fails, PE funds in general may command higher risk premia than
previously estimated.16 If both H2 and H3 hold, private information represents a “double-edged
sword” since GPs would return capital before an industry downturn when the fund performance
has been good but will retain capital through a market downturn (typically associated with
higher volatility) when their overall performance has been bad. In either case, LPs’ choice of
a PE manager should incorporate GPs’ market-timing track record as well as the likelihood of
subsequent fundraising difficulties that may trigger the adverse incentives to risk-shift. Note
that either H2 or H3 imply H1 but the converse is not true.
The discussion so far has not differentiated between types of funds (e.g., buyout and ven-
ture), but it seems plausible that the logic should apply to all cases where managers could have
valuable private information (or the skill to extract it). Therefore, I will not distinguish between
types of funds in the hypotheses testing. The following definitions are helpful for formulating
16For example, as in Franzoni et al.(2012), Sørensen et al.(2014).
26
specific tests.
• Industry Return – return of a representative portfolio of publicly traded equities for the
fund’s industry.
• Informed Rush – a period of high rate of distributions from a fund to LPs when (a)
the fund GP has a positive track record of market-timing, and (b) the fund to-date per-
formance enables the GP to receive carried interest (e.g., if the fund were to resolve
immediately).
• Informed Stays – a period of low rate of distributions after the end of investment period
when (a) the fund GP has a positive track record of market-timing, and (b) the fund
significantly underperforms its peers to-date and has not yet raised a successor fund.
4.3 Research Design
Most tests in my analysis are obtained by estimating versions of the following model:
IndustryReturnij,1:12 = βTreatedijRushij + γ1Treatedij + γ2Rushij + aj + ij, (4.1)
where IndustryReturnij,1:12 is the mean monthly Industry Return over the 12 months
following the distribution quarter when the NAV of fund i drops below X% of the total
distributions prior to that quarter,
Treatedij is a binary variable denoting Informed Exits,
Rushij is the fraction of distributions over the preceding 6 quarters in the funds’ total
distributions to date,
aj is fund group fixed effects (some specifications will include additional controls),
X% is the distribution threshold defining fund i stopping-time.
This specification amounts to a difference-in-difference estimation which accounts for a
time-varying supply of market-timing signals from PE fund cash flows. For some valuation
peaks there might not be enough mature funds to consider timing these peaks, particularly,
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when testing at the industry level. Once in the harvesting stage, GPs are generally uncon-
strained in the choice of the exit year, so time fixed effects would be inappropriate controls.
Instead, I cluster standard errors by stopping-quarters.
The definition of Treated uses the information set for fund i stopping-quarter so that there
is no look-ahead bias in the construction of the key variables. The appropriate threshold, X ,
is an empirical question so I examine several values (between 5% and 25%) and report two:
15% and 20%. For simplicity and transparency, I use a range of reasonable values over the
alternative of modeling fund-specific or group-specific thresholds. The higher the threshold,
the more exposure GPs (subjected to the treatment effect) have remaining, the less different the
interpretation of their Rush from that in the control group (see below).17 The lower the thresh-
old, the lower the sensitivity of the market-timing signal filtration, the greater the ambiguity
about the incentives driving the most recent exits (as discussed in the previous section).18 Note
that the threshold, X , affects not only the stopping-time but also the Rush amount.19
The primary coefficient of interest is β which compares the relation between Rush and
Industry Return following the exits by Treated funds with that in a control group. A signif-
icantly negative β would indicate that Informed Rush precedes lower Industry Return, as per
hypothesis H2.
4.3.1 Identification Strategy
In one set of tests, the control group includes all funds that did not meet the criteria of
Informed GP which means that upon reaching the threshold X% they either (a) did not have
a positive track record of market-timing, or (b) the fund to-date performance was below the
hurdle rate. These tests (i) assure that the stopping-time definition based on X-threshold is
not responsible for the results, and (ii) identify the market-timing effect from a Footprint-on-
Firms effect. The estimates are presented in Section 5.5.1. They constitute a comprehensive
17This idea underlies some of the placebo tests discussed in Section 5.5.1.
18Also, fewer funds of relatively recent vintage years reach the threshold.
19In our sample, for about half of the funds there will be no difference across 15% and 20% thresholds since
both levels are crossed simultaneously.
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examination of hypotheses H1 and H2 while identifying GPs market-timing skills from the
effects of Pseudo-timing and Footprint-on-Firms.
Note that for Treated funds, Rush is proportional to carried interest at a very specific time
in a fund’s life – when it is nearly finished cashing in its carried interest. Hence, a comparison
with the effect of control fund Rush times will isolate market-timing from the Footprint-on-
Firms. In other words, the Footprint-on-Firms effect of Rush will be present in both groups,
treatment and control, while the market-timing effect will be in the treatment group only.20
Vintage year fixed effects (in place of group fixed effects) account for exit conditions vary-
ing across funds that are associated with the Pseudo-timing alternative (i.e. time-varying risk
premia). I include additional controls in some specifications to address industry-quarter vari-
ation that vintage year fixed effects do not absorb. Conceptually, I need variables with mar-
ket return predictive power to measure the incremental effect of variation in Rush across In-
formed Exits.21 I follow Goyal and Welch (2008) in the return-predictive variables selection,
re-defining variables at industry level where appropriate. The additional controls common
across industries include CAY Ratio of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), VIX index, U.S. Trea-
sury yields and corporate credit spreads.22 Industry specific controls include price-earnings
and book-to-market ratios de-meaned using the respective 5-year moving average to account
for heterogeneity across industries. Following Ball et al.(2011), I also control for pre-exit in-
dustry returns by including the industry cumulative excess return versus S&P500 over 5-years
prior to the stopping-quarter.
20In additional tests, I verify that the results are unlikely to be due to the magnitude of Footprint-on-Firms being
cross-sectionally correlated with the treatment assignment by comparing Rush effects in the treatment and control
groups in periods different from the stopping-time and considering definition of treatment group that maximize
expected Footprint-on-Firms effects.
21In arbitrage-free asset-pricing framework, these variables inform about the state of investors marginal utility.
Thus, another way to interpret these tests is whether GPs’ timing skills add value once controlling for the variation
in investors’ marginal utility.
22It has been shown that much of predictive ability of Lettau-Ludvigson CAY comes from the fact that its
construction uses “lookahead (in-sample) estimation regression coefficients”. For example, see Goyal and Welch
(2008). To the extent β estimates continue to hold with and without CAY, the predictive capacity of Rush in
Informed Exits is orthogonal to the innovations in the U.S. aggregate consumption and income.
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To guard against the Price Distortion alternative, I examine the reversion of initial returns
following Informed Rush versus those in the control group. Suppose the subsequent returns
were driven purely by a selling pressure, possibly magnified by “copycat” behavior of some
investors tracking PE actions. If this were the case, we would expect the valuations in the
affected industries to rebound as the pressure subsided while the expected deterioration in
the industry fundamentals failed to materialize. Meanwhile, replacing the dependent variable
in model (4.1) with funds’ holding period abnormal returns and breaking Treated into its
skill and incentive components yields a test of H3 corollary. That is, lower holding period
abnormal returns of funds run by informed GPs without the accrued performance fee incentive
to optimally exit would be consistent with a deviation from the first-best decision (from the
LPs’ stand point).23
4.3.2 Alternative Control Group
As helpful as it can be to identify GP timing skill from Footprint-On-Firms, the control
group comprised of a subset of funds is imperfect. Its limitations originate mainly from two
(conflicting) objectives: (i) likely high false-negative assignment of treatment, (ii) highly im-
balanced fund population over time and industries. It is possible that, conditional on the as-
sumption that exit-Footprint is zero, one can do much better by estimating the market-timing
effect against random exits by the same fund (rather than against actual exits by other funds).
Therefore, in Section 5.5.2 I run additional tests against hypothetical stopping-time and Rush-
amounts of the sample funds. These tests provide more accurate and robust (i.e. to Pseudo-
timing alternative) estimates of β but, unlike the results with a control group comprised of
actual funds (5.5.1), yield no power to distinguish GPs’ market-timing skill from the Footprint
alternative. They furnish additional insights about hypothesis H2 and its corollary, in particular,
allowing for testing of Industry Return predictability by Rush unconditional on the treatment
23In other words, those GPs would then appear to be ignoring the private information regarding the industry val-
uations in order to keep their option to earn performance fees alive (rather than to maximize the total performance
for LPs).
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assignment.
To conduct these additional tests, I develop a simulation-based estimator that shares much
in common with Simulated Method of Moments, yet better suites this problem.24 In short, I
(i) estimate a model of fund fixed effects for stopping-time and Rush (henceforth auxiliary
model), (ii) independently simulate 1,000 blocks of up to 100 random exits per fund under
this model (henceforth, independent simulations), and (iii) pool Model (4.1) (main model)
estimates over these independent simulations. The estimates that I obtain are not sensitive to
the simulation starting point, are very unlikely to be driven by an ill-specified null hypothesis,
and have good finite-sample properties.25 In Section 5.5.2, I also test hypothesis H3 using a
slight modification of Model (4.1) and a subset of the sample augmented with the simulated
exits. The modification amounts to using standard deviations of past Industry Returns as the
dependent variable instead of the future means and restricting the sample of actual fund to
those that lived long enough.
Finally, to determine what drives Informed Rush, GPs’ expectations about industry cash-
flow news or about discount factor innovations, I utilize model 4.1 but swap the future industry
returns with Rush as the the dependent variable and instrument the returns with, respectively,
proxies of industry cash-flow news or discount rate news. Such a design allows me to ad-
dress the problem that there are arguably no proxies of, e.g. cash-flow news uncorrelated with
discount-rate news (and visa-verse). Treating the proxy for the other channel as the included
instrument enables me to better absorb the unrelated variation while making sure that the chan-
nel of interest is, in fact, correlates with Rush tightly enough. These tests are implementable
using both types of control exits: those of other funds and the simulated ones for the treated
funds. Section 5.5.3 has the results and further details.
In summary, my key identifying assumption is that the alternative explanations to the timing
24Section 5.5.2 and A.2 provide further details, discussion as well as robustness and falsification tests.
25See Appendix A.8.
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skill do not depend on the changes in GPs’ own wealth exposure to the industry valuations. I
verify this assumption via a series of placebo tests and event studies. I obtain the main results
(hypotheses H1 and H2) using a simple difference-in-difference estimator and then verify them
via simulations, essential for testing H3.
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5 MAIN RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
5.1 Informed Exits Versus Uninformed
Figure 5.1 reports results from simple event studies by examining cumulative Industry re-
turns from -8 to +10 quarters around the stopping-time as defined by a crossing of the 15%
threshold of NAV/(total distributions to-date) for funds with high (above vintage year median)
Rush. The light-gray line represent the mean of Treated funds, meaning where TTR-to-date>1
and IRR-to-date>Hurdle Rate. We can see that in comparisons to all other funds with high
Rush (the dark-gray line), the Industry returns are on average significantly lower following
the stopping-quarters of Treated. Panel A reports results for the full sample period. Panel B
shows that this clear difference remains even after excluding 2 years associated with particu-
larly dramatic market declines (2001 and 2008). Panels A and B also suggest that the results
are unlikely to be driven by differences in the systematic risk, since the cumulative returns
are similar from 8 to 3 quarters before the stopping-time.1 This evidence is consistent with
hypotheses H1 and H2. While this figure shows the main result clearly, the additional tests are
necessary for determining if it is robust to alternative explanations.
1In Figure A.5, I provide further evidence against the risk-based explanation by showing that a quarterly
rebalanced portfolio based on Informed Rush yields statistically significant 60-90bps per quarter over Fama-
French 3-factor model.
Figure 5.1: Informed Rush and Industry returns: Event Studies
This figure plots cumulative Industry returns around the stopping-time for funds with a clustering of exits (hence-
forth, Rush) above the median for the respective vintage year. Rush is defined as a fraction of distributions over 6
quarters before the stopping-time in the fund total-to-date. The stopping time is defined as the distribution quar-
ter at which NAV dropped below 15% of the fund total distributions to-date. The Industry returns are those of
S&P500 subindex of the GICS sector that the fund specializes in. The light-gray (Treated) line is the mean across
funds that as of the stopping-quarter meet two criteria: (a) positive track record of market timing as proxied by
TTR > 1 (Section 3), (b) the fund to-date performance enables GPs to receive carried interest (if the fund were to
resolve immediately) as proxied by net-of-fees IRR above the hurdle-rate. The dark-gray line comprise of funds
that do not meet these two criteria. Panel A reports results for the full sample. Panel B excludes stopping times
that occurred in 2001 and 2008. The bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
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According to Figure 5.1, the industry share price underperformance following Informed
Rush fades after 4-6 quarters and does not revert over the 10 quarter horizon plotted. A rever-
sion would be expected if the underperformance were driven by the Price Distortion alternative
discussed in Section 4. That explanation is also inconsistent with the pattern in Figure A.4B
which plots a similar event study as Figure 5.1A but for the funds that did not “rush to exit”
(Rush<vintage median). It appears that when Informed and incentivized GPs procrastinate
with trimming relatively small exposure (as manifested by “low-rush”), the industry share price
performance tends to improve, just as we conjectured in Section 4.4.2. However the industry
returns do not become abnormally good as if there were some short-lived distortions in the
valuations caused by “copycat” behavior of some investors. Rather the returns become very
close to these around the control group exits which, in turn, appear unchanged from before the
stopping-quarter.
As discussed in Section 4, for Informed Exits, Rush is proportional to carried interest at a
very specific time in a fund’s life – when it is nearly finished cashing in its carried interest.
Thus, while the Footprint-on-Firms effect of Rush will be present in both groups, treatment
and control, the market-timing effect will be in the treatment group only. The identifying
assumption is that the variation in the impact of PE fund participation on the industry is inde-
pendent from the treatment assignment. Namely, that Rush by funds with good market-timing
track records (i.e., high TTR up to the exit date) and sufficiently high performance does not
have stronger spillover effects on publicly traded peers than by the funds in the control group.
Fortunately, this assumption is relatively easy to verify.
By estimating Model (4.1) within the sample of actual funds, I nest the event studies of Fig-
ure 5.1 and A.4 in a multivariate setting. This also allows for isolating the effect of GPs’ timing
skills from the rational responses to variations in exit condition over time (i.e., the Pseudo-
timing alternative discussed in Section 4). Table 5.1 reports these estimates. Columns (1) and
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(2) report the baseline specification (with controls comprised of fund vintage-year fixed ef-
fects only) for the stopping-quarters corresponding to 15%- and 20% NAV/(total distributions
to-date) thresholds respectively. Columns (3) and (4) expand the set of controls to include
month- and industry-month covariates that previous literature considers informative about ex-
pected returns. Subsequently, I will refer to these interchangeably as predictive covariates or
Pseudo-timing factors.
Panel A of Table 5.1 reports results for the baseline definition of the treatment group: funds
with TTR > 1 and IRR > Hurdle as of the respective stopping-time. For expositional
clarity, I denote this dummy as a product of two dummies, TTRg1*IRRgHR. Recall that our
main coefficient of interest is on its interaction with Rush, β. Regardless of the specification, it
is significantly negative. Meanwhile, the coefficient on Rush itself is positive but statistically
zero. Thus, the data are highly supportive of hypotheses H1 and H2: Informed Rush predicts
lower Industry Return once the variation in exit conditions has been accounted for.
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Table 5.1: Informed Rush versus Uninformed
This table reports predictive regressions of Industry returns by Informed Rush. Industry returns are of S&P500
subindex corresponding to the GICS Industry sector of the fund specialty. Informed Rush is a proxy for the carried
interest “cashed-in” by GPs with a positive track record of market timing in the past, as measured by TTR (Section
3). As discussed in Section 4 and 5.5.1, I estimate β from the following difference-in-difference model:
E[IndustryReturnij,1:12] = βTreatedijRushij + γ1Treatedij + γ2Rushij + aj
where IndustryReturnij,1:12 is a mean monthly Industry Return over 12 months following the fund i stopping-
time, Rushij – a fraction of distributions (to LPs) over the last 6 quarters in the funds’ total-to-date, aj – fund
vintage-year fixed effects. In Panel A Treatedij is a single dummy based on whether TTR (IRR) as of stopping
quarter exceeds 1 (Hurdle-rate) while Panel B breaks it into the constituent dummies. Stopping-times in odd (even)
numbered specifications are fund-quarter when fund NAV drops below 15 (20)% of the fund total distributions
up to that quarter. Specifications (3)-(4) include additional return-predictive covariates, same in both panels.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at stopping-quarters, */**/*** denote significance at 10/5/1%.
Panel A: Treated ≡ (TTR > 1)× (IRR > HR)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TTRg1*IRRgHR*Rush −0.025*** −0.023*** −0.013** −0.013**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
TTRg1*IRRgHR 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Rush 0.004 0.002 0.007 0.006*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Industry CAR −0.219 −0.224
(0.287) (0.252)
Industry P/E −0.005** −0.005***
(0.002) (0.002)
Industry B/M −0.037** −0.023**
(0.015) (0.011)
CAY-ratio 0.549*** 0.521***
(0.109) (0.099)
CBOE VIX 0.040* 0.036
(0.023) (0.024)
BAA-AAA spread 0.009* 0.009*
(0.005) (0.005)
AAA-UST spread −0.030*** −0.029***
(0.005) (0.005)
UST 10-year yield −0.009*** −0.010***
(0.002) (0.002)
UST 3-month yield −0.003*** −0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Vintage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 893 941 893 941
R2 0.218 0.234 0.446 0.464
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Panel B: Treated ≡ (TTR > 1) + (IRR > HR) + (TTR > 1)× (IRR > HR)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TTRg1*IRRgHR*Rush −0.031** −0.026** −0.022** −0.021**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010)
TTRg1*IRRgHR 0.006 0.005 0.006* 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
TTRg1*Rush 0.001 −0.004 0.008 0.004
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
IRRgHR*Rush 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.009
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
TTRg1, IRRgHR, Rush Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vintage Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Predictive covariates No No Yes Yes
Observations 893 941 893 941
R2 0.225 0.239 0.446 0.466
The dependent variable is the subsequent 12-month average return of public firms in the
primary industry of the fund. The magnitude of β tells us how much lower monthly returns
would be as we increase the Informed Rush. The inter-quartile range for the Rush is approx-
imately 0.3. This translates into 0.3-0.7% lower returns per month over the course of a year.
Thus, the economic significance of the information in Treated is substantial. Ball et al.(2011)
also question whether the post-exit returns are negative as possibly a stronger statement about
the timing ability. Wald tests reject the null of β + γ1 + γ2 = 0 at 5% confidence level in all
specifications but (4).2
It is interesting to note that the β estimates are about twice as large in specifications (1) and
(2) as compared to specifications (3) and (4) indicating that substantial variation in Informed
Rush can be explained by the publicly observable signals about expected returns. This fact
suggests that GPs tend to not return capital when market observables point to relatively high
risk premia (which is consistent with results in Robinson and Sensoy (2013)). Nonetheless,
it follows from specifications (3) and (4) that the exit decisions by skilled and incentivized
GPs appear to contain a significant information component that is likely absent from the public
information set.
Next, Panel B of Table 5.1 breaks down the Treated-dummy definition into its constituents,
2Hence, the absolute returns are negative up to the vintage year fixed effect.
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TTR > 1 and IRR > Hurdle, and examines the effect of each interaction with Rush sepa-
rately to formally test the corollary to H2. In this case, TTRg1*Rush measures the predictive
effect of Rush by funds that appear skilled but likely do not have as much skin in the game. For
them, there is no in-the-money carry option that may vanish before the normal resolution time
is past due. We see that none of these individual conditions has Rush associated with lower
subsequent returns. But the negative coefficients on TTRg1*IRRgHR*Rush (now truly a triple-
interaction) appear even stronger than in Panel A, although the magnitudes are not formally
comparable between the two panels. Besides providing further evidence on the significance of
GP agency, this result suggests that TTR-to-date is indeed a good proxy of GP market-timing
skill since it predicts funds’ propensity to sell closer to industry highs and buy around lows.
I scrutinize the assumption about the variation in the industry spillover effects across funds
in relation to Footprint-on-firms alternative. First, I verify that lower Industry returns do not
follow stopping-quarters of top-PME funds, conditional on TTR<=1. That is when treated
funds are comprised of those exhibiting highest asset-nurturing skills and yet with a mediocre
market-timing track record. Admittedly, these should be GPs with the highest potential for an
industry impact through company turnarounds and operational engineering. Panel A of Table
A.2 shows that, in settings like Model (4.1), such a treatment definition returns positive (but
not consistently significant) estimates of β (rather than negative as in the Table 5.1). Second, I
examine if Informed Rush outside the stopping-quarter periods is associated with future Indus-
try returns. That is, when there is less difference in the GPs’ market-timing incentives between
treated and control groups. Results of this placebo test are reported in Panel B of Table A.2 and
show no statistically or economically significant relations that could justify reasonable doubts
in the interpretations for Table 5.1.
5.1.1 Does Rush Hurt Holding Period Returns?
Next, I examine whether the portfolio gains that LPs experience due to the market-timing
by Informed GPs (harvesting their performance fees) come at a cost of inferior holding period
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returns of their funds. Generally, if this were the case, we would expect that the gains from
company selection and nurturing (as proxied by Kaplan-Schoar PME) to be negatively corre-
lated with the gains from buying near the industry lows and selling at the peaks (as proxied
by TTR). Although results in Table 3.1 suggest that this correlation is actually positive, they
do not provide evidence of the relation between the extent of exits’ clustering as measured by
Rush (Informed and not) relates to the funds’ holding periods returns which represent a more
significant component of the overall abnormal performance (on average).3
Moreover, we want to learn the abnormal holding period returns by funds where Informed
GPs apparently refrained from exiting ahead of the market downturns. If their decisions “to
stay” were driven by the objective to maximize the total performance for LPs, we would expect
that the average holding period abnormal returns of their funds to be higher.4.
As discussed in section 4.4.2-4.3, a replacement of the industry returns subsequent to the
stopping-times with the funds’ holding period abnormal performance in model (4.1) yields the
required tests.Table 5.1 reports the estimates.5 As in Panel B of Table 5.1, Treated-dummy
is broken into its constituents, TTR > 1 and IRR > Hurdle. To zoom at GPs’ portfolio
company selection and nurturing effects, I add industry fixed effects to vintage-year fixed ef-
fects while there is no purpose to condition on the risk-premia covariates at the stopping time
anymore.6
3As follows from Table 2.1 and Figure 3.1, average PME exceeds 1.3 for my sample while the average TTR is
less than 1.1. Nonetheless, for 44% of funds in my sample TTR exceeds PME.
4So that GPs’ informed decisions “to stay” could have been optimal from the overall performance maximiza-
tion standpoint
5For brevity, I only report results for the stopping-quarter definition based on 15%-NAV-to-Distributions
threshold. The results are similar with a threshold between 10 and 20%.
6Dropping industry fixed effects leaves the estimates largely unchanged and key takeaways intact.
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Table 5.1: Does Informed Rush Sacrifice Holding Period Returns?
This table reports estimates of the following model:
E[HARij ] = βTreatedijRushij + γ1Treatedij + γ2Rushij + aj
where HARij is the holding period abnormal return of fund i as measured by a natural log of Kaplan-Schoar
PME at the latest available date (henceforth, Last PME) against the fund industry and the broad market in spec-
ifications (1) and (2), respectively. While in specifications (3) and (4), it a log of a ratio of Last PME (industry
or market) to the PME as of the fund’s 5th anniversary. Rushij – a fraction of distributions (to LPs) over the
last 6 quarters before the stopping-time in the funds’ total-to-date, Treatedij denote dummy variables based on
whether TTR (IRR) as of stopping quarter exceeds 1 (Hurdle-rate), aj – fund vintage-year and industry fixed ef-
fects. Stopping-time is the first fund-quarter with non-zero cash-flows when fund NAV drops below 15% of the
fund total distributions up to that quarter. The sample includes funds with stopping-times of at least 7 years since
inception. The industry and market returns are proxied by, respectively, S&P500 subindex corresponding to the
GICS Industry sector of the fund specialty and CRSP valued-weighed index. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by fund vintage year, */**/*** denote significance at 10/5/1%.
PME 0:T PME 5y:T
industry market industry market
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rush Effects:
TTRg1*IRRgHR*Rush 0.068 0.034 0.415 0.362
(0.602) (0.624) (0.568) (0.536)
TTRg1*Rush 0.234 0.430 0.041 0.143
(0.440) (0.428) (0.359) (0.392)
IRRgHR*Rush 0.286 0.360 −0.058 0.053
(0.399) (0.354) (0.398) (0.358)
Rush −0.514* −0.567** 0.104 0.073
(0.256) (0.242) (0.224) (0.205)
Base Effects:
TTRg1*IRRgHR 0.150 0.087 −0.025 −0.066
(0.153) (0.159) (0.175) (0.160)
TTRg1 −0.342*** −0.239** −0.300*** −0.185**
(0.099) (0.092) (0.086) (0.089)
IRRgHR 0.659*** 0.718*** 0.361** 0.404***
(0.120) (0.112) (0.146) (0.132)
Vintage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sum(Rush Effects) 0.074 0.257 0.502 0.631
p-value 0.757 0.422 0.000 0.001
Observations 796 796 796 796
R2 0.383 0.433 0.271 0.279
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The differences across specifications in Table 5.1 amount to the dependent variable only. In
specifications (1) and (2), it is Kaplan-Schoar PME at the latest available date (henceforth, Last
PME) against the fund industry and the broad market, respectively. While the funds that had
neither performance in excess of the hurdle rate nor a good timing track-record (TTR > 1)
indeed appear to attain lower life-time PMEs when their exits cluster a lot towards the last
few quarters of active operations (i.e. Rush ≈ 1), all the interaction terms with Rush are
positive. The cumulative effect on PME for Informed Rush (reported in the bottom of the
table) is actually positive, although not significant statistically. Thus, I conclude that there is
no evidence of holding period performance sacrifice by GPs exhibiting Informed Rush.
Meanwhile, the significantly negative coefficient on TTRg1 indicates that the “non-Rushing”
Informed GPs who were not making any performance fees, have had significantly lower hold-
ing period returns for their investors than that the control funds. This would be expected if
those GPs were primarily concerned with keeping their option to earn performance fees alive
at a cost of LPs’ value maximization objective.7 Consistent with the corollary to H3.8
In specifications (3) and (4), I focus on holding period returns specifically during the peri-
ods of exits (i.e. while Rush is measured). Therefore, I define the dependent variables as a log
of a ratio of Last PME (industry or market) to the PME as of the fund’s 5th anniversary. To
keep the results comparable across specifications while meaningful in all of them, I constrain
the sample to funds with the stopping-time of at least 6.5 years since inception.9 The results
regarding TTRg1 (and thus corollary to H3) continue to hold firmly in specifications (3)-(4)
suggesting that much the performance deterioration for the funds run by those “non-Rushing”
Informed (but yet to become very rich) GPs actually occurs after the investment period com-
pletion.
7As discussed earlier, exiting earlier may also reduce the amount of performance-independent fees the GPs
charge to their funds.
8In the untabulated analysis, I also verify that funds run by informed GPs that appear to rush have significantly
shorter life than the control group, whereas when Rush is near zero, the life is longer, albeit insignificantly.
9The results in (1)-(2) little change if all funds with 15%-threshold reached are included.
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The results regarding the sensitivity on the funds’ PME growths during the resolution pe-
riod to Rush are somewhat surprising though. The main coefficient is no longer even negative
while interactions with just TTRg1 and just IRRgHR are much closer to zero suggesting that
Rush-to-exits depends on returns attained earlier during the funds’ lives.10 Nonetheless, the
key results - a positive cumulative effect of Informed Rush remains qualitatively unchanged
from specifications (1) and (2), indicating no evidence of holding period fund performance
cannibalization from market-timing of exits by Informed GPs. In contrast, the positive effect
appears stronger economically and statistically during the resolution period.
In summary, the evidence presented in section 5.5.1 is strongly and consistently supportive
of hypotheses H1 and H2. This suggests that GP industry timing skill is present and likely
beneficial for LP portfolios and that the cash flow liquidity risks of LPs could be well rewarded.
However, I also find a support for H3 corollary indicating that Informed GPs may drag the
fund’s performance down as well. Overall, the evidence so far is hard to rationalize with
Footprint-effects being non-zero as far as private equity exits are concerned. The fact that the
skill proxy, TTR-to-date, predicts subsequent exit success is suggestive of GP timing skills with
regards to entry as well.11
5.2 Informed Rush versus Random
There are several limitations to the control group constructed from actual funds. First, it
is not entirely clear what drives β, good timing by the treatment group or bad timing by the
control group. Meanwhile, it would be interesting to further examine whether PE funds rushing
to exit predict industry returns on average, regardless of GP skill and incentives. Second,
the control group may be “contaminated” by funds whose GPs, in fact, do have timing skill
10These estimates may also be sensitive to cross-sectional differences in NAVs’ reporting by GPs, e.g. see
Brown et al.(2013).
11None of this rules out a presence of Footprint effects upon entry though. In fact, positive β estimates in
Panel A of Table A.2 are consistent with (some) PE funds having positive and lasting impact on the industry
performance.
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and proper incentives. Third, the β estimates presented above do not recognize how vintage-
industry and fund-specific variation may interact with the stopping-time decisions and Rush
amounts. Fourth, the treated and control industries may differ in the level of systematic risk.
While the second concern suggests that I may be underestimating the magnitude of the effect,
the directional effects of the other three are difficult to determine.
Accordingly, I also estimate Model (4.1) using random (hypothetical) stopping-times and
Rush amounts in place of the control group exits.12 Specifically, I obtain these from simulating
residuals under a simultaneous equation model of fund stopping-times and Rush by drawing
bi-variate normal shocks from a covariance matrix, which itself is drawn (each time) from a
Wishart distribution parametrized by the covariance matrix of the observed residuals. That is,
the residuals from actual fund stopping-times and Rush-amounts that were used to estimate the
simultaneous equations model. My estimation is asymptotically equivalent to the following
just-identified Simulated Method of Moments:
12Note that the dependent variable in Model (4.1) is essentially stock returns. These resemble a random walk
up to some variation in risk-premia. Hence, once risk-premia are controlled for and Footprint effects of PE
exits are ruled out, there should be no difference under the null hypothesis of Model (4.1) between the sample
Rush/stopping-times from their random combinations. In other words, neither actual nor simulated exits, should
explain the future stock returns (residual to the risk-premia) under the null hypothesis of Model (4.1). This is the
argument I rely on in efforts to overcome the econometric challenges outlined in the previous paragraph, examine
the magnitudes and robustness of estimates presented in Section 5.5.1, and test hypothesis H3. It is important
to highlight that the economic question of interest makes these two estimators particularly good complements as
they mitigate the vulnerability of assumptions that each one requires. That is, with a control group consisting of
hypothetical exits we need to assume-away Footprint-on-Firms while with a control group consisting of actual
funds we need to assume-away their differences with respect to the exit-conditions/risk-premia variation.
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)]
= 0
E
[
Z3ji
(
IER(θt,r,Σ)− βT ·R(θt,r,Σ) + γ1T + γ2R(θt,r,Σ) + FFE
)]
= 0 (5.1)
E
[(
ST (θt,r,Σ)ji
R(θt,r,Σ)ji
)
⊥ FFE(j)
]
= 0
E
[(
ST (θt,r,Σ)ji
R(θt,r,Σ)ji
)(
ST (θt,r,Σ)ji
R(θt,r,Σ)ji
)′
⊥ FFE(j)
]
= W2(Σ, 1)
where the first two restrictions use only the sample data while the remainder involve simulated
data and:
Z1j , Z2j and Z3ji denoting the sets of all covariates in the respective moment restriction;
FFE is a set of dummies denoting expected stopping month and Rush for each actual
fund j as per functions f(...) and g(...) evaluated at the parameters’ values θt and θr re-
spectively;
W2(Σ, 1) – a draw from Wishart distribution with 1 degree of freedom, parametrized
by 2x2 positive definite Σ, the covariance matrix of the sample fund residuals:
(
STj −
Ej[ST ]
)
and
(
Rj − Ej)[R]
)
;
ST (θt,r,Σ), R(θt,r,Σ) – simulated values of stopping-time and Rush under the parame-
ters θt, θr and Σ, equal to the sample stopping times and Rush for the actual funds: STj
and Rj;
IER(θt,r,Σ) – mean Industry Return over 12 quarters following the stopping month ac-
cording to ST (θt,r,Σ) and fund j inception month;
T – a dummy taking value of 1 for actual funds and zero otherwise.
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Although consistency of moment-based estimations does not depend on distributional as-
sumptions (provided that the moment restrictions are valid), simulating stopping-time and rush-
amount shocks from a randomly drawn covariance matrix is important for correct inference in
a situation like this. One way to think of this procedure is that it allows for error-term het-
eroskedasticity and clustering under Model 4.1 which is certainly possible in the population
of funds. Another motivation for these simulation parameter perturbations is that they allow
for uncertainty in the covariance matrix estimates (Σ). Again, absence thereof would be an
unrealistically strong assumption.13
The obvious disadvantage of estimating Model 4.1 with a simulated control group is that
the null hypothesis for β itself then depends on the estimated parameters.14 However, unlike
in the “one-shot” SMM estimation of Model 5.1, my three-step procedure allows for directly
examining the properties of the (simulated) null hypothesis underlying the inference about β
(Figure A.8). The three steps are as follows: (i) estimate a model of fund fixed effects for
stopping-time and Rush (henceforth auxiliary model), (ii) independently simulate 1,000 blocks
of up to 100 random exits per fund under this model (henceforth, independent simulations),
and (iii) pool Model (4.1) (main model) estimates over these independent simulations (akin
Fama-MacBeth) being highly conservative in the asymptotic variance computation.
5.2.1 Auxiliary Model
Table the A.3 reports auxiliary model of fund fixed effects that I estimate as two Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions (Zellner, 1964). The fact that under the null hypothesis of Model (4.1)
stopping-time and Rush do not predict Industry returns should relieve possible concerns about
13Note that similar ideas underlie imputations via the Gibbs sampler and some Bayesian inference methods.
For example, see Lancaster (2004).
14It is not uncommon in the literature though. For example, see the analysis of restricted fund access effects on
performance in Sensoy, Wang, and Weisbach (2013).
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simultaneity in the formations of the dependent variables or other sources of endogeneity.15,16
It is insightful to think about this auxiliary model as simply a density-mass filter for possible
Stopping-time – Rush combinations.
The number of observations in Table A.3 reflects that for funds where 15% and 20% thresh-
olds were not crossed simultaneously, I have repeated observations of Rush, stopping-time and
the covariates. I make use of these data structure to increase the estimates precision. Most of the
explanatory power for both equations comes from vintage×industry fixed effects.17 Nonethe-
less, all other variables that I include significantly explain the stopping time and have signs
consistent with the economic intuition. Specifically, fund log-size is positively related to how
long it takes to resolve it while superior performance, as measured by PME and IRR-tercile,
associates with shorter durations.
Unsurprisingly, the duration of existing funds also correlates with the fundraising success
by GPs as the loadings on Follow-on Raised and Follow-on w/n 6 qtrs dummies suggest.18
While positive loading on the fraction of capital called by the next fund may speak about the
GPs’ economic optimism (or asset-hoarding). The same set of covariates has much less success
in explaining Rush with R2 being only 0.132.19 Fewer explanatory variables are significant
statistically, although the signs on all coefficients are economically intuitive.
The fitted values by fund-threshold for both stopping-times and Rush represent the projec-
tions of fund fixed effects on the set of these covariates that I will use in place of aj dummies
in estimating Model (4.1) in each of the independent simulations. The better the fit, the smaller
15See A.2 for a discussion of the implications for main model estimates arising from possible endogeneity in
the auxiliary model.
16I functionally transform both dependent variables to insure that any simulated stopping-time is positive while
simulated Rush is between zero and one.
17I consolidate the buckets as described in A.2 to have at least 9 funds sharing the same vintage-industry
dummy.
18Follow-on w/n 6 qtrs=1 means that as of the stopping-time, the GPs are likely on a eventually successful road
show.
19This is very much in-line with findings in Robinson and Sensoy (2011) that fund age and calendar
time(quarterly) fixed effects explain less than 8% of the aggregate private equity cash-flow variation.
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the covariance matrix of stopping-times and Rush residuals that I will use to parametrize the
simulations. Therefore, I exclude fund type dummy (i.e. venture or buyout) among other co-
variates that add more noise than explanatory power. Importantly, I treat the residual covariance
matrix estimate as randomly drawn from a population.20 See A.2 for further methodological
details and discussions.
5.2.2 Refining Base Estimates
Table 5.2 reports the simulation-based estimates of Industry returns predictive regressions
I ran in the previous section. As in Table 5.1, specifications (1)-(2) correspond to the stopping
times under 15-20% thresholds for the baseline model whereas specifications (3)-(4) also in-
clude additional Pseudo-timing controls. The point estimates and standard errors in Panel A
(B) of Table 5.2 are the simulation-based counterparts of Panel A (B) of Table 5.1.21 They
support a conclusion that the industry market-timing is indeed statistically present among GPs
and that both ingredients (incentive and skill) are necessary.
20Thus, although the sample correlation between the residuals is -0.19, its value is stochastic over the simulated
samples.
21Note that in each case the control group is formed only of the pseudo exits that correspond to the treated
funds.
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Table 5.2: Actual Rush versus Random
This table reports simulation-based estimates of predictive regressions of Industry returns by Rush, a fraction of
distributions over the last 6 quarters in the funds’ total-to-date. Industry returns are of S&P500 subindex corre-
sponding to the GICS Industry sector of the fund specialty. The estimation methodology is described in Section
5.5.2 and A.2. In short, I (1) estimate a model of fund fixed effects for stopping-time and Rush (henceforth aux-
iliary model) Table A.3, (2) independently simulate 1,000 blocks of up to 100 random exits per fund under this
model (henceforth independent simulations), and (3) pool main model estimates over these independent simula-
tions. The main model is:
E[IndustryReturnij,1:12] = βTreatedijRushij + γ1Treatedij + γ2Rushij + aj
where IndustryReturnij,1:12 is a mean monthly Industry Return over 12 months following fund i actual or
simulated stopping-time, depending on whether Treatedij = 1 for the actual funds of interest or Treatedij = 0
otherwise;Rushij – actual or simulated fraction of distributions over the last 6 quarters in the funds’ total-to-date,
aj – “fund fixed effects” estimates from the auxiliary model. Panel A [B] includes funds that as of stopping-time
have (i) a positive track record of market timing as measured by TTR defined in Section 3 and [or] (ii) net-of-fees
IRR in excess of the contractual Hurdle-rate. Panel C includes all funds. Stopping-times in odd (even) numbered
specifications are fund-quarter when fund NAV drops below 15 (20)% of the fund total distributions up to that
quarter. Specifications (3)-(4) include additional return-predictive covariates, as in Table 5.1. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at stopping-quarters, */**/*** denote significance at 10/5/1%.
FundFE FundFE+PseudoTiming
15%thld 20%thld 15%thld 20%thld
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Treated(dummy) ≡ (TTR > 1)× (IRR > HR)
TTRg1*IRRgHR*Rush −0.017*** −0.017** −0.016*** −0.014**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
# of Actual funds 373 387 373 387
Pseudo funds per 1 Actual 95.8 95.4 95.8 95.4
Panel B: Treated(dummy) ≡ (TTR > 1) + (IRR > HR) + (TTR > 1)× (IRR > HR)
TTRg1*IRRgHR*Rush −0.032*** −0.026** −0.034*** −0.027***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
TTRg1*Rush 0.008 0.002 0.012 0.005
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
IRRgHR*Rush 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
# of Actual funds 756 791 756 791
Pseudo funds per 1 Actual 95.4 94.5 95.4 94.5
Panel C: Treated(dummy) ≡ All Actual Funds
ActualFund*Rush −0.006 −0.007 −0.005 −0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
# of Actual funds 893 941 893 941
Pseudo funds per 1 Actual 95.0 94.3 95.0 94.3
Applies to Each Panel:
# of independent simulations 1000 1000 1000 1000
Rush, Treated(dummies) Yes Yes Yes Yes
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[Insert Table 5.2 here]
In addition, Panel C of Table 5.2 tells what we could not learn with the control group com-
prised of actual funds – whether aggregate private equity distributions are informative of future
Industry returns, unconditionally on the GPs’ situation. The loading on ActualFund*Rush, al-
though negative, is economically small (about 0.15% per month) and appears to be far from
being significant statistically. Of course, one cannot rule out that the relation is stronger with
Rush defined differently or in some subsets of funds orthogonal to the incentive and skill di-
mensions that I pursue. However, the magnitudes in Panel C do indicate that the mean effect
for funds that form the control group in 5.5.1 is indeed very close to zero with rather moderate
variance.
Note also that, unlike in Table 5.1, the point estimates with additional Pseudo-timing con-
trols are very close to those with just the baseline fixed effects, particularly, for the 15% thresh-
old case where the effect is stronger (specifications (1) and (3)). This is because the (projec-
tions of) fund fixed affects absorb much of the (co)variation in these controls and Rush. In other
words, to the extent the expected market (industry) returns tend to change slowly, controlling
for the fund fixed effects obtained from our auxiliary model is sufficient. In Figure A.8A I also
show that, consistent with a knowledge-based explanation, the return predictability vanishes as
one moves to sectors which did not correlate with the funds primary industry in the recent past.
Robustness tests are reported in Figure A.7.
5.2.3 Evidence of Informed Stays
As per section 5.5.1, Informed GPs without a “skin-in-the-game” do not sell at the market
peaks yet do not deliver better holding period returns either, consistent with the corollary to
H3. I now turn to tests of hypothesis H3 that questions whether GP timing skills might also
hurt LP interests through more “asset-hoarding” ahead of high volatility times. These tests
will determine whether GPs acted as out-of-the money option holders by delaying the exercise
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in the anticipation of higher asset volatility.22 Note that even though LPs may also benefit
from the option value of a distressed equity claim, it appears unlikely that such risk-shifting by
GPs implements a first-best portfolio choice from their LP perspective. Instead of keeping the
assets in the fund, most LPs could obtain equivalent systematic and comparable idiosyncratic
volatility exposures while not footing the bill for the GP’s call-option.
To proceed with the tests, I change the dependent variable in Model (4.1) from future mean
of Industry returns to past volatility and redefine the treatment group. I estimate volatility as
annualized standard deviation of monthly returns {-6 to 0} and {-12 to -8} quarters relatively to
the respective fund’s stopping-time. The first window corresponds to the period over which the
Rush is measured. Hence, it shall speak about how the fund distributions’ clustering associates
with abnormal industry volatility. The second window is more interesting since high values of
Rush imply that there were very few distributions made before the {-6 to 0 quarters} window
while the fund fixed effect projections insure that the volatility is abnormal relative to the fund
inception date×industry and other fund- and firm-level covariates (see Table A.3). The results
for the first window can be thought of as a placebo experiment that informs about differences
in abnormal volatility within the treated funds during the Rush period which may confound our
interpretation of the results for the second window.
The treatment group now consists of funds that (a) have a positive track record of market-
timing (TTR¿1), and/or (b) where GPs face a survival risk beyond the term of the current fund.
I assume that the survival risk would be determined by a combination of the following two
conditions: (i) whether net-of-fees IRR was in the bottom or top tercile among type×vintage-
year peers (Btm/Top), and (ii) whether a successor fund has been raised (NoNext/YesNext).23
To not confound interpretations by high-order interaction terms, I define three non-overlapping
22Similar to management seeking to increase riskiness of company assets when incentivized by distressed
equity as per Jensen and Meckling (1976), Galai and Masulis (1976) among others.
23Clearly, an existence of a follow-on fund commitment from investors keeps the GPs “in-business” for the
next decade while the current fund performance is a significant determinant of the fundraising odds as per Barber
and Yasuda (2014).
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groups of interests: BtmNoNext, BtmYesNext, TopNoNext. Also, to avoid a look-ahead bias and
unrealistic assumptions, I now measure TTR and IRR as of the 5th anniversary of the respective
fund and constrain the sample to funds with actual stopping-times of at least 8 years from
inception. This insures that the funds are not too young to make any distributions during the
{-12 to -8} quarters window, while the to-date performance signals are meaningful and yet not
overlapping with the volatility observation windows.
Arguably, BtmNoNext-funds face the highest incentive to hoard the fund assets since their
GPs likely have no performance fees to collect from the current and future funds. The trade-
off is less clear for BtmYesNext)-funds’ GPs. On the one hand, the asset-hoarding benefits the
value of their OTM option to earn performance fee in the current fund. On the other hand, such
a behavior may tarnish their relationships with investors and negatively affect the odds of future
fundraising. Chung et al. (2011) show that the present value of expected fees (performance-
based and fixed) from the future funds (yet to be raised) may exceed those of from the current
fund. Meanwhile, the examination of the effects for TopNoNext-funds completes the analysis
by identifying the role of current performance in the risk-shifting incentives. There should be
zero effects to the extent performance fees in the current fund reduce GPs risk-appetite and/or
high current performance rank significantly increases the odds of fundraising success.
Table 5.3 reports the results for the stopping-quarter defined based on 15%- NAV/“total
distributions to-date” threshold. All specifications include the projections of fund fixed effect
(from the auxiliary model) and the main terms of Rush and Treated. Specifications (3) and (4)
also include the levels of VIX index as the fund stopping-quarter and the {-12 to -8 quarters}
or {-6 to 0 quarters} window respectively to better absorb heterogeneity across treated funds
and zoom at the industry-specific innovations to the volatility. As before, I break the treatment
dummy into its constituents, incentive and timing skill. Interpretations would be somewhat
ambiguous if the coefficients on Treated×Rush were significantly different from zero in {-6
to 0} window, either statistically or economically. This is clearly not the case as specifications
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(1) and (3) suggest - the volatility during the Rush periods is neither abnormal (relatively to
the hypothetical exits) nor meaningfully different within Treated funds across the incentive and
skill dimensions. Therefore, the results for {-12 to -8 quarters} shall provide us with a clean
test of H3.24
24That is whether a risk-shifting behavior by an Informed GP is more likely to have an adverse effect on LP
portfolios as compared to risk-shifting behavior of an uninformed GP.
53
Table 5.3: Risk-shifting Evidence
This table reports simulation-based estimates of abnormal volatility of Industry returns. Industry returns are of
S&P500 subindex corresponding to the GICS Industry sector of the fund specialty. The estimation methodology
is described in Section 5.5.2.3 and A.2. In short, I (1) estimate a model of fund fixed effects for stopping-time and
Rush (henceforth auxiliary model, Table A.3), (2) independently simulate 1,000 blocks of up to 100 random exits
per fund under this model (henceforth independent simulations), and (3) pool main model estimates over these
independent simulations. The main model is:
E[IndustryV oltyij,h] = βvTreatedijRushij + γv1Treatedij + γv2Rushij + aj
where IndustryV oltyij,h annualized standard deviation of monthly returns {-6 to -0} and {-12 to -8} quarters
of fund i actual (i.e. Treatedij = 1) or simulated stopping-time; Rushij – actual or simulated fraction of
distributions over the last 6 quarters in the funds’ total-to-date, aj – “fund fixed effects” estimates from the
auxiliary model. The estimation is over funds with actual stopping-time of at least 8 years that as of the 5th
anniversary had (i) a POSITIVE track record of market timing as measured by TTR> 1 (Section 3) or (ii) where
the firm faces high survival risk as measured by net-of-fees IRR in the bottom tercile among type×vintage-year
peers (Btm) and/or no successor fund raised up until at least the 6th quarter before the stopping quarter (NoNext).
For brevity, the union (Btm ∩ NoNext = 1), (Top ∩ NoNext = 1),(Btm ∩ Y esNext = 1) is referred to
(SurvivalRisk = 1).
The stopping quarter is the first quarter with non-zero distributions to LPs when a fund’s NAV drops below
15% of the fund’s total distributions up to that quarter. Specifications (1) and (3) report results for the volatility
over the {-6 to 0 quarters} window from the stopping-quarter which corresponds to Rush measurement period.
Specifications (2) and (4) report results for the {-12 to -8 quarters} window which corresponds to at least the sixth
year of the fund operations. Note that high values of Rush indicate that relatively few distributions to LPs have
been made before quarter-6 from the stopping. Besides the main terms of Treated constituents, (TTR > 1),
(SurvivalRisk = 1) and their interaction, the list of control variables includes Rush and the projections of fund
fixed effect (from the auxiliary model) while in Specifications (3) and (4) it also includes the levels of VIX index
as the fund stopping-quarter and the {-12 to -8 quarters} or {-6 to 0 quarters} window respectively. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at stopping-quarters, */**/*** denote significance at 10/5/1%.
-6:0q -12:-8q -6:0q -12:-8q
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated ≡ (TTR5y > 1) + SurvivalRisk + (TTR5y > 1)× SurvivalRisk
TTRg1*BtmNoNext*Rush 0.025 0.075** 0.007 0.064**
(0.027) (0.038) (0.022) (0.030)
TTRg1*TopNoNext*Rush 0.007 −0.010 0.012 −0.010
(0.020) (0.025) (0.016) (0.019)
TTRg1*BtmYesNext*Rush 0.006 −0.015 0.001 −0.007
(0.012) (0.017) (0.009) (0.015)
BtmNoNext*Rush −0.001 −0.009 0.006 −0.010
(0.012) (0.015) (0.007) (0.012)
TopNoNext*Rush −0.006 0.018 −0.006 0.007
(0.011) (0.019) (0.007) (0.016)
BtmYesNext*Rush 0.006 0.016 0.000 0.002
(0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008)
TTRg1*Rush −0.006 −0.006 0.003 −0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
Rush, Treated(dummies), Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
VIX levels No No Yes Yes
# of Actual funds 596 596 596 596
Pseudo funds per 1 Actual 94.6 94.6 94.5 94.1
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Specifications (2) and (4) of Table 5.3 strongly support H3. While the industry volatility
associations with the divestment schedules continue to be insignificant for funds that appear to
have just timing skill but no incentive to risk-shift (and vice versa), there is a stark difference
when both conditions are satisfied. Positive and significant coefficient on TTRg1*BtmNoNext*Rush
in specification (2) suggests that an inter-quartile (0.33) increase in Rush by such funds asso-
ciates with approximately 2.5 percentage points higher per annum volatility of the industry
returns in the quarters preceding the Rush. Since the fraction of distributions prior the 6th
quarter before the stopping equals 1-Rush, it follows that these GPs had made abnormally few
distributions before the industry volatility became abnormally high. Controlling for the sys-
tematic volatility levels within the window and at the fund resolution date, as per specification
(4), leaves the results essentially unchanged.
The projections of fund fixed effects reflect funds’ inception dates. Therefore, the fund-
specific control-groups of hypothetical exits account for differences in the volatility paths
since fund inception (e.g. as of the 5th anniversary). Besides, negative but insignificant
from zero coefficients on TTRg1*TopNoNext*Rush strongly suggest against the effects on
TTRg1*BtmNoNext*Rush being driven by some unaccounted time variation (i.e. when many
funds had no successor by mid-life). Thus, we can conclude that Informed GPs who have in-
centives to hoard fund assets appear to be significantly more likely to steer their funds through
periods of high turbulence in the industry having made abnormally few distributions before the
onset of these periods.
Meanwhile, the effectively zero coefficients on TTRg1*BtmYesNext-terms indicate that
poorly performing GPs but with a successor fund nonetheless do not exhibit such risk-shifting
behaviors, no matter whether Informed or not. This is consistent with the corollary H3B and
suggests that expected flows from future funds do restrain managers from “destroying value”
(consistent with the framework of Chung et al., 2011). However, given that H2 and corollary
hold as well, these future funds flows alone appear to not be enough to induce “first-best”.
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To sum for Section 5.5.2, I confirm that (i) hypotheses H1 and H2 hold, and (ii) the market
predictability appears to relate to industry-specific knowledge of GPs and pertain to the cash-
flow fundamentals. If (and only if) the GPs are Informed and have accrued carry at stake, do
PE fund distributions predict Industry Return. Finally, I find support for hypothesis H3 that
risk-shifting by Informed GPs is more hazardous for LPs’ performance.
5.3 What Are GPs Informed about: Cash-flows or Discount-rates?
In the previous sections, I provide evidence of public equity returns predictability by the
patterns of private equity fund distributions to their investors. That predictability appears to
originate from private information that GPs learn while managing their funds rather than to
belong to the public markets information set Et. As per Campbell and Shiller (1988), we can
attribute the unexpected asset returns to (i) the revision of expectations about current and future
cash flows it pays (≡ NCF,t+1), and (ii) the revision in expectations about future discount rates
the investors require (≡ NDR,t+1):
rt+1 − Etrt+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρj∆dt+1+j − (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
ρjrt+1+j
= NCF,t+1 −NDR,t+1
where ρ = 1/exp{d− p}, dt (pt) is the asset log dividend (price) in period t, while rt is the
required log rate of return for the period.
I this section, I study whether the GPs are able to foresee NCF,t+1 and/or NDR,t+1. As
discussed earlier, both channels could be at play as a result of GPs potential involvement in
the operational management of the portfolio companies company and their special position in
capital market that enables them to observe portfolio demands of various public and private
investors. To accomplish such tests, one could simply replace future returns in (4.1) with
NCF,t+1 and than with NDR,t+1. However, empirically, there are no proxies of cash-flow news
would be uncorrelated with discount-rate news (and visa-verse). For example, even though the
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information on realized earnings are readily available, analysts forecasts thereof likely depend
on the expected returns. Similarly, forward price-earning ratio also reflect the expected cash
flows and, hence, their innovations.
To attain a stronger evidence regarding the links of Informed Rush to a particular channel
(cash-flows or discount rate) in the realized industry returns, I swap the future industry returns
with Rush as the the dependent variable in model (4.1) and instrument the returns (now on the
RHS) with, respectively, proxies of industry cash-flow news or discount rate news. Treating the
proxy for the other channel as the included instrument enables me to better absorb the unrelated
variation while making sure that the returns’ channel of interest, in fact, correlates with Rush
strongly enough.25 I proxy for cash-flow news by Industry EPS Surprise and Industry For-
ward PE ∆, respectively. Both are computed from EPS estimates for the respective S&P500
GICS Industry sector subindex: 12-month trailing values and the next two fiscal year analysts’
consensus forecasts as obtained from Bloomberg.26
Table 5.4 reports the results. The coefficients on Treated × IndRet and IndRet are es-
sentially a reverse regression estimates of the coefficients on Treated × Rush and Rush in
model (4.1). Although their magnitudes are now less convenient to interpret, the basic intuition
remains unchanged – significantly negative coefficient indicates that Rush preempts a period
of lower returns in the Industry. All specifications include industry expected returns covariates
to proxy for Etrt+1.27 Specifications (1) and (3) use actual fund exits as the control group,
corresponding to the approach in Table 5.1, while specifications (2) and (4) report simulation-
based analysis of the question, as described in Section 5.5.2. First-stage regression results are
summarized by the partial F-statistic (via Kleibergen-Paap Wald test) and show no evidence of
the instruments’ weakness in either case.28
25Since the standard errors are computed based on residuals from returns rather than the fitted values.
26The results are robust to alternative definitions of the proxies and different specification of the IV-estimator.
27Industry 5-year CAR, P/E, B/M; CAY-ratio CBOE VIX, BAA-AAA spread, AAA-UST spread, 10-year and
3-month UST.
28For simulation-based estimates, reported sample size and F-statistics are averages across 1,000 simulations.
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Table 5.4: What Are PE Managers Informed About: Cash Flows or Discount
Factor
This table reports instrumental variable regression estimates of Rush on next 12 months Industry returns:
E[Rushij ] = βrivTreatedijIndRetij,1:12 + γriv2IndRetij,1:12 + γr1Treatedij + Controls
, where Rush is a fraction of distributions over the last 6 quarters in the funds’ total-to-date; Industry returns are
of S&P500 subindex corresponding to the GICS Industry sector of the fund specialty; Treated is dummy that
proxies for incentives and market-timing skill of the fund’s GP, as per Panel A of Table 5.1 and the Informed Rush
definition in 4.4.2.5.
In specifications (1) and (2), the excluded instruments are Industry EPS Surprise and its interaction with Treated-
dummy, while Industry Forward PE ∆ and its interaction with Treated-dummy are added to the 1st and 2nd
stage regressions along with the other return-predictive covariates (see Table 5.1) and the fund group fixed effects.
Therefore, specifications (1) and (2) test whether GPs foresee the industry cash-flow news and act accordingly.
While specifications (3) and (4) treat the terms with Industry Forward PE ∆ as excluded instruments while
including Industry EPS Surprise in the set of other covariates and, thus, test whether GPs foresee innovations in
the discount-rates for the industry cash-flows. Industry EPS Surprise and Industry Forward PE ∆ are computed
from EPS estimates for the respective S&P500 GICS Industry sector subindex: 12-month trailing values and the
next two fiscal year analysts’ consensus forecasts as obtained from Bloomberg.
Specifications (1) and (3) use other sample funds as the control group and fund inception year fixed effects while
specifications (2) and (4) use hypothetical fund exits (for Treated funds only) as the control group (reported are
the pooled estimates across 1,000 simulations, the methodology is described in Section 5.5.2 and A.2). Standard
errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, */**/*** denote significance at 10/5/1%.
Excluded Instrument:
Industry EPS Surprise Industry Forward PE∆
(1) (2) (3) (4)
̂Treated× IndRet −3.825** −2.465** −1.194 0.846
(1.733) (1.042) (2.968) (2.569)
̂IndRet 0.315 0.097 −1.517 0.300
(1.249) (.228) (1.842) (0.343)
Treated 0.012 0.017 −0.032 −0.025
(0.023) (0.038) (0.026) (0.015)
Included Instruments Forward PE∆ EPS Surprise
Included Inst.×Treated Yes Yes Yes Yes
Predictive covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Funds Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
Fixed Effects Vintage Fund Vintage Fund
SE Cluster Quarter Fund Quarter Fund
1st stage K-P Wald stat. 17.9 332.4 6.8 15.3
Observations 848 32,832 848 32,832
R2 (# of Simulations) 0.158 (1,000) 0.15 (1,000)
58
In specifications (1) and (2), the excluded instruments are Industry EPS Surprise and its in-
teraction with Treated-dummy, while Industry Forward PE ∆ and its interaction with Treated-
dummy are added to the 1st and 2nd stage regressions along with other covariates and the
fund group fixed effects. Significantly negative coefficients on Treated × IndRet indicate
that skilled GPs foresee the industry cash-flow news that cause the industry returns to fall.
The point estimates suggest that aggregate earnings surprise that would trigger a 10% fall in
industry index is on average preceded by 25-38 percentage points higher Informed Rush.
Specifications (3) and (4) use the terms with Industry 1-year Forward PE ∆ as excluded
instruments while including Industry EPS Surprise in the set of other covariates and, hence,
test whether GPs foresee innovations in the discount-rates that investors require for the industry
cash-flows. Although the point estimates on Treated × IndRet and IndRet are negative
according to Specification (3), they are far from being significant statistically, so as their sum
(untabulated). Furthermore, these coefficients are not even negative (while also insignificant)
according to specification (4) which uses hypothetical exits as the control group that should
better absorb the fund heterogeneity and variations in Etrt+1.
Thus, it appears that the GPs’ forecasting edge is limited to the cash-flow process in the
industry of specialization. Whereas their public and capital market activities do not seem to
yield important insights about swings in the marginal public market investor’s risk preferences.
It is quite plausible that discount-rates’ shocks rarely originate in a particular industry but are
rather driven by events outside the industry. It is also consistent with results in Section 5.5.2.2,
showing that predictability of returns by Informed Rush decays outside of the native industry.
59
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, I document evidence consistent with private equity fund managers (GPs)
being more informed about certain publicly traded firms’ valuations than marginal investors in
public markets. This can create value for the private equity fund investors beyond the ways
that have been analyzed in the literature. Learning through the private investment/divestment
process appears to be the source of this knowledge which enables GPs to have some ability to
time industry peaks and troughs. This knowledge appears to persist and pertain to the industry
cash-flow fundamentals as measured by public firms’ aggregate earnings news.
However, while such a market-timing yields economically significant benefits for the funds’
investors (LPs), it is not always concordant with the GPs’ objectives. The incentives are adverse
if the current fund’s return is below the performance fee hurdle and the GPs are unable to raise
a subsequent fund. In these cases, skilled GPs are likely to delay fund distributions ahead of
elevated industry volatility periods. Hence, the results in this paper have strong implications
for managers and contract choice by LPs. Investing with highly reputable GPs that are less
likely to face fundraising difficulties reduces the ex-ante probability of the asset hoarding with
more adverse consequences for LPs. Conversely, fund terms should contain more provisions
protecting against the asset hoarding in general (i.e. at a cost of limiting the potential gains
from more delegation) if the likelihood for such adverse incentives to emerge is relatively high.
I show that private fund cash flows tend to predict subsequent returns in the industry only when
the GPs have performance fees to harvest. This finding demonstrates the importance of an
explicit performance-based compensation in delegated investment management in general (in
comparison to an “implicit” compensation in the form of future fund flows).
My tests isolate GPs’ market-timing skills from reactions to time-varying market conditions
and causal effects of private equity funds activity spillovers on public firm policies. However,
this informed trading by GPs is unlikely to go completely unnoticed by other investors in capital
markets. If so, private equity funds may have a positive causal effect on the informational effi-
ciency of the capital market, providing a channel for how private information gets impounded
into the public market prices. For example, the tech-bubble of the late 1990s and the financial
intermediation frenzy of 2006-07 might have been even greater if not for the flood of private
equity exits trying to preempt the busts. Hence, the role and the importance of professionally
managed private capital pools in the modern capital markets (increasingly subject to Moral
Hazard) might have been underappreciated.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Additional Data and Discussion of the Institutional Background
In a buyout, a company is acquired using a relatively small portion of equity and a large
portion of outside debt financing. In a typical transaction, the private equity fund buys the
majority control of a mature firm (not necessarily publicly traded). In contrast, venture funds
typically invest in young or emerging companies often through convertible debt or preferred
shares, and usually do not seek to obtain a majority control. In both cases, however, the fund
managers, GPs, closely monitor and exert influence on the acquired company activities, nor-
mally through active membership on the board of directors. See Gompers and Lerner (1996),
Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2008), Metric and Yasuda (2009) for detailed accords on private equity
business models. Sorensen (2007), Acharya, Gottschalg, Hahn and Kehoe (2008), Hochberg,
Ljungqvist, and Lu (2010), Gompers, Kovner, and Scharfstein (2010), Cai, Sevilir and Tian
(2012), Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) among others suggest a micro-foundation for GPs
impact on portfolio companies that relates to entrepreneur rational self-selection, institutional
network effects as well as financial, operational and “managerial” engineering.
The company would typically be one of many investments the funds undertake which, in
turn, is a small portion of candidates that would get screened during the approximately 5-year
investment period. Unlike for portfolio investors in public companies, the information set of
the fund GPs would not be limited by standard disclosure requirements even if the fund have
yet to become a stake-holder. On a confidential basis, GPs are free to request any data about
the company business in possession of the management. GPs tend to specialize in certain in-
dustries and types of businesses. This makes the signals about business fundamentals obtained
through the monitoring and prospective investments due diligence quite complementary. This
complementarity potentially makes GPs’ information sets even better than that of a individual
company’s management as well as that of investors in public markets.
Both funds, buyout and venture, would target a total life of about 10 to 13 years from the
investment period start date. The holding durations tend to be 4 to 7 years with some exits
occurring earlier than 2 years after the original investment while some - after 10 years. For
investments that do not go bankrupt, the exit routes are either IPO or an acquisition. The latter
can be further broken-down by the type of acquirer: (i) another private equity fund or group of
investors (financial investors) or (ii) an operating firm, possible private too, that is strategically
interested in the production capacity of the target’s assets (strategic investors). Transactions
with non-financial buyers constitute the most frequent type of exits and often referred to as
“trade-sales”. The IPO route typically fetches the highest return on investment, yet other exit
routes (except bankruptcy) are on average profitable as well. For example, see Ball et al.(2011)
for a comprehensive venture deals sample and Degeorge et al.(2013) for buyouts.
Before the investment period concludes, buyout and venture GPs would normally attempt to
raise a new fund. The interval between fund starts would be 2 to 5 years with the average being
3.5 years for both buyout and venture funds. For example, see Brown et al.(2013). There are,
of course, numerous reasons for GPs (and LPs) to want the lives of the funds to overlap. One of
the consequences of this practice is a continuous flow of information about similar companies
fundamentals, on the one hand, and investor portfolio demands, on the other (Including signals
about fellow private equity firms capital growth trend as it relates to prospective competition
among financial buyers for the current portfolio companies). These largely non-public infor-
mation flows that GPs regularly participate in both, buyout and venture, can be summarized
via the following scheme.
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Figure A.1: Private Information Cycle
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Figure A.2: Timing Track Records: Examples
This figure plots pair-wise comparisons of Timing Track Record (TTR) values for 8 hypothetical fund capital calls
(CCallst) and distribution (Distribt) schedules (#1–#8) and a common (mean-zero) market return (rt) schedule.
The cash-flow schedules are from the LPs’ perspective so that the negative values represent capital calls that sum
to $50 for all but fund #2. All are derived from the following value process:
FundV aluet = FundV aluet−1(1 + rm,t) + CCallst −Distribt
As discussed in Section 3, in this case the fund money-multiple equals TTR and reflects the gross-return due to
selling near the market peaks during the fund life-time and buying near the troughs. Formally, TTR is determined
according to the following formula:
TTR =
∑T
t=1Distribt·e
r1,T ·(1−t/T )∑T
1 CCallst·e
r1,T ·(1−t/T ) /
∑T
t=1Distribt·e
rt,T∑T
1 CCallst·e
rt,T
,
where rt,T (r1,T ) is market return from cash flow date(fund inception) until fund resolution. Top-left panel demon-
strates that very different schedules can be equally market-timing neutral. Top-right panel reviews the case of buy-
ing at trough. Bottom-left panel demonstrates the effect of selling at peak whereas bottom-right panel combines
timing of both, entry and exit.
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Figure A.3: Industry Returns and Fund Inceptions
This figure reports intertemporal distributions of Industry returns in Panel A and the sample private equity funds
in Panel B. Each observation in the box-plot of Panel A represents a 12-month return of S&P500 GICS industry
sector subindex. The increment between intervals is one month so that there are 12 observations for each of the 10
industry sectors. Panel B plots total number of funds in the sample by vintage-year as well as the number of funds
with a positive track record of market timing in the past, as measured by TTR – the gross-return due to selling
near the market peaks during the fund life-time and buying near the troughs as per Equation (3.1) (Section 3).
Panel A: Industry Returns
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Panel B: Funds by vintage and TTR group
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
All Funds End-life TTR>1
66
Figure A.4: Timer’s Rush and Industry Returns: Additional Event Studies
This figure plots cumulative Industry returns around the stopping-time for funds that had Rush above (below)
the fund vintage year median in Panel A (Panel B). Rush is a fraction of distributions over 6 quarters before the
stopping-time in the fund total-to-date. The stopping time is defined as the distribution quarter at which NAV
dropped below 15% of the fund total distributions to-date. The Industry returns is S&P500 subindex of the GICS
sector that the fund specializes in. The light-gray (Treated) line is the mean across funds that as of the stopping-
quarter meet two criteria: (a) positive track record of market timing as proxied by TTR > 1 (Section 3), (b)
the fund to-date performance enables GPs to receive carried interest (if the fund were to resolve immediately) as
proxied by net-of-fees IRR above Hurdle-rate. The dark-gray line comprise of funds that do not meet these two
criteria. Panel A reports results for funds with above-median Rush the full sample by stopping-year triplets while
Panel B pools across all stopping times and below-median Rush (See Table 5.1 for above-median Rush). The bars
denote 95% confidence interval.
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Figure A.5: Timer’s Rush and Industry Returns: Quarterly Portfolios
This figure reports performance of a portfolio that is rebalanced quarterly based on Informed Rush signal (portfolio
B) in comparison to an equally-weighted 10 GICS sector portfolio (A), also rebalanced quarterly. Portfolio B sells
Industry sectors where two or more Treated funds exhibited above-median Rush at their stopping-time over the
past 3 or 7 quarters (i.e. [0,+2q] or [0,+6q] observation window respectively) and buys the remaining sectors
(equally-weighted). Rush is defined as a fraction of distributions over 6 quarters before the stopping-time in the
fund total-to-date distributions. The median is computed over all funds of the same type (venture or buyout)
incepted in the same year. The stopping time is defined as the distribution quarter at which NAV dropped below
15% of the fund total distributions to-date. Treated funds satisfy the following criteria: (a) positive track record
of market timing as proxied by TTR > 1 (Section 3), (b) the fund to-date performance enables GPs to receive
carried interest (if the fund were to resolve immediately) as proxied by net-of-fees IRR above the hurdle-rate.
Panel A reports cumulative returns since 1999Q1 through 2013Q1 for both portfolios (A&B), their Sharpe-ratios
and the number of sectors shorted in B end of each quarter. Panel B reports abnormal return estimates of portfolio
B in excess of risk-free rate (rf ) or portfolio A relatively to value-weighted CRSP or three-factor Fama-French
model. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to autocorrelation, */**/*** denote significance at 10/5/1%
confidence level.
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Panel B: Abnormal Return Estimates
[0,+2q] [0,+6q]
B-rf B-rf B-A B-rf B-rf B-A
alpha 0.012** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.011** 0.008** 0.005*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
mktrf 0.689*** 0.757*** −0.164*** 0.465*** 0.530*** −0.391***
(0.086) (0.060) (0.042) (0.083) (0.081) (0.070)
smb −0.179*** 0.058* −0.162** 0.075
(0.045) (0.034) (0.072) (0.056)
hml 0.257** 0.114* 0.273** 0.130
(0.101) (0.065) (0.113) (0.081)
N 95 95 95 95 95 95
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Table A.1: TTR Cross-Section: Robustness and Placebo
This table reports linear regression model estimates of the log of funds’ end-life TTRs. TTR is defined in Section
3 and measures the gross-return due to selling near the fund industry peaks during the fund life-time and buying
near the troughs. The industry returns are proxied by those of GICS Sector index corresponding to the fund
specialty. The explanatory variables are: ln(Sequence)i - chronological order of the fund inception date by
given GPs (the private equity management firm); ln(PME)i - log of the fund’s Kaplan and Schoar (2005) Public
Market Equivalent Index; ln(TTR)i−1 - log of the GP’s previous fund TTR; the respective industry return over
the fund life-time (Trend) and its interaction with the respective variables of interest. Panel A reports regression
estimates using actual values of TTR. Panel B reports the corresponding coefficients from simulations based on
hypothetical exit schedules but actual funds’ operation dates and industry return paths. The exit schedules are
calibrated to match the sample means conditional only on time since a fund inception. The underlying fund
holding period return-generating process (α, σi and β) is specified relatively to the industry. Specifications (2)
through (6) include fund vintage-year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by GP, */**/***
denote significance at 10/5/1% confidence level.
Panel A: TTRs based on the Actual Exit Schedules
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(IndSequence)i 0.060** 0.061*** 0.051** 0.053**
(0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
ln(PME)i 0.058*** 0.083*** 0.080***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.025)
ln(TTR)i−1 0.149*** 0.103* 0.093*
(0.050) (0.052) (0.051)
Vintage FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sequence × Trend Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
PME × Trend No No Yes No Yes Yes
Past TTR × Trend No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 756 756 756 404 404 404
R2 0.049 0.384 0.397 0.440 0.463 0.470
Panel B: TTRs based on Random Exit Schedules - Mean(SD) Coefficient Across 1,000 Simulations
α = 0bp, σi = 0%, β = 1.0
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Ind. Seq. 0.009 0.009
(0.011) (0.011)
Curr. PME 0.016 0.016 0.016
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053)
Past TTR −0.017 −0.018 −0.018
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
α = 0bp, σi = 40%, β = 1.0
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Ind. Seq. 0.009 0.009
(0.012) (0.012)
Curr. PME 0.017 0.017 0.017
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Past TTR −0.016 −0.017 −0.017
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
α = 250bp, σi = 40%, β = 1.0
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Ind. Seq. 0.009 0.009
(0.012) (0.012)
Curr. PME 0.019 0.019 0.019
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
Past TTR −0.018 −0.018 −0.019
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
α = 250bp, σi = 40%, β = 1.5
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Ind. Seq. 0.016 0.016
(0.018) (0.018)
Curr. PME 0.030 0.030 0.030
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Past TTR −0.018 −0.017 −0.019
(0.058) (0.057) (0.057)
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Table A.2: Do Exits Cause Downturns?
This table reports predictive regressions of Industry returns by placebo-substitutes for Informed Rush to provide
further support for the identification scheme deployed in Table 5.1. The underlying difference-in-difference es-
timation, the dependent variable (mean Industry Return 12-months forward return), and all other controls as the
same as in the respective specification of Table 5.1A. But either the stopping-time and Rush or the treatment
group is defined differently. In both panels, specifications (3)-(4) have predictive covariates added but otherwise
are identical to (1)-(2).
In Panel A, I conjecture that funds with the greatest Footprint-on-Firms shall be those with best abnormal returns
on invested capital. Since PME and TTR are correlated (as per Table 3.1), I only look at the subset of those funds
where TTR<=1 to not confound the treatment group with that in 5.1A. Hence, Treatedij is a dummy taking
value of 1 if as of stopping quarter (i) Kaplan-Schoar PME is in the respective fund-type×vintage-year top tercile
and (ii) TTR is less than 1 (Section 3). While Rushij is defined as before, a fraction of distributions over the last
6 quarters in the funds’ total-to-date. Correspondingly, the stopping-times in odd (even) numbered specifications
are fund-quarter when fund NAV drops below 15 (20)% of the fund total distributions up to that quarter.
In Panel B, I keep the same definition of the treatment group as in 5.1A but look at fund distributions at different
times rather than the stopping. Recall that under the Footprint-on-firms alternative, exits per se should have im-
pact on Industry performance rather than the extent they remove GPs carried interest exposure to adverse market
moves. Specifically, I look at a 4-quarter period with maximum cumulative distributions outside (-18,12) months
window around the stopping time defined by 15% threshold (i.e. before 15%, after 15%). Also, I now measure
rush amounts in $ so that they are more proportional to the industry market capitalization (and hence, potential
impact). To have magnitudes and distributions close to those of actual Rush, I define MaxRush as the probit func-
tion of log($mln/10).
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at stopping-quarter level, */**/*** denote significance at 10/5/1%.
Panel A: Treated ≡ PME ∈ TopTer · TTR < 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TopPME*TTRl1*Rush 0.017** 0.015* 0.007 0.010
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
TopPME*TTRl1 −0.002 −0.002 −0.000 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Rush −0.010** −0.012** −0.000 −0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Vintage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Predictive covariates No No Yes Yes
Observations 893 941 893 941
R2 0.196 0.214 0.442 0.462
Panel B: Treated ≡ (TTR > 1)× (IRR > HR), Rush outside exit period
before15% after15% before15% after15%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TTRg1*IRRgHR*MaxRush −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
TTRg1*IRRgHR 0.002 −0.001 0.002 −0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
MaxRush 0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Vintage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Predictive covariates No No Yes Yes
Observations 562 500 556 500
R2 0.001 0.003 0.052 0.287
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Table A.3: The Model of Fund Fixed Effects
This table reports a model of funds’ stopping-time and rush amounts estimated as Seemingly Unrelated
Regressions for all funds in my sample. The dependent variables are (1) the natural logarithm of number of
quarters since the fund’s inception when a threshold of the NAV to total distributions has been crossed from above
(has to be a quarter with non-zero distributions to LPs); (2) a probit function of a fraction of distributions (to LPs)
over the last 6 quarters in the funds’ total-to-date. The explanatory variables are same in both linear equations:
ln(Size)i – log of the fund $ capital committed; PME-to-date – Kaplan-Schoar PME against S&P500 subindex
corresponding to the fund GICS Industry sector specialty; TopTercl IRR-to-date – dummy that equals 1 if the
fund IRR is in the top tercile over the fund-type×vintage-year peers; Follow-on Raised – dummy that equals 1
if at least one more fund by the same GPs have started investments 2 years after the current fund inception date;
Follow-on w/n 6 qtrs – dummy that equals 1 if another fund by the same GPs will start investments within 6
quarters from the current fund stopping-quarter; Follow-on CapCalled – capital called by the last-most follow-on
fund by GPs as a fraction of committed (0 if no follow-on exists); Industry-Year FE – the fund specialty GICS
Industry-sector×vintage-year fixed effects. I include two observations per fund where 15% and 20% thresholds
were not crossed simultaneously and the resulting stopping-times are different. This the auxiliary model to obtain
the fitted values of “fund fixed effects” (with respect to the stopping times and rush amounts) and parametrize
random exit simulations (via the covariance matrix of SUR residuals) – see Section 5.5.2 and A.2 for discussions
and details. */**/*** denote significance at 10/5/1%.
ln(Stopping − time) Φ−1(Rush)
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
ln(Size) 0.017*** (0.006) −0.092*** (0.023)
PME-to-date −0.036*** (0.004) 0.128*** (0.016)
TopTercl IRR-to-date (d) −0.165*** (0.014) −0.151*** (0.052)
Follow-on Raised (d) −0.056** (0.024) 0.122 (0.086)
Follow-on w/n 6 qtrs (d) −0.110*** (0.021) 0.143* (0.075)
Follow-on CapCalled (%) 0.063*** (0.016) −0.054 (0.057)
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 1242
R2 0.442 0.132
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A.2 Simulation-related Supplements and Discussions
A.2.1 Recap and Robustness
In this section I provide additional details about the simulations-based estimation method that I de-
ploy in Section 5.5.2 to refine the estimates of the key coefficient of interest that measures the sensitivity
of subsequent Industry Returns to Informed Rush. The method involves three steps.
First, I estimate models of expected ln(stopping − time) and Φ−1(Rush) for all funds in our
sample as linear functions of: (i) Vintage-Industry fixed effects; (ii) Fund size, PME-to-date, IRR-rank-
to-date; (iii) GPs follow-on fund start dates and investments activity where available.1 We treat the
two equations as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions as per Zellner (1964), but the main model estimates
are essentially unchanged if I allow simultaneity in the stopping-time and Rush and use IV-estimates
of the expected values (untabulated). I utilize the pseudo-panel structure of Rush and stopping-time
observations per fund where the pattern of fund distribution permits so.2. Besides the expected values, I
also obtain the covariance matrix of the residual ln(stopping − time) and Φ−1(Rush). This auxiliary
model estimates are presented in Table A.3.
Second, I draw a sample of 100 random bivariate normal shocks from a covariance matrix that is
itself randomly drawn each time from Wishart distribution parametrized by the the covariance matrix
of residuals estimated in the first step. In doing so, I allow for uncertainty about the first-step estimates
and for heteroskedastic error term in the unobserved population, essential in the third step.3 The same
shocks are merged to each fund-threshold in the sample. Adding fund-threshold-specific estimates of
expected ln(stopping − time) and Φ−1(Rush) and reverting the functional transformations, I obtain
the simulated (aka placebo) values of stopping-time and Rush for each fund-threshold in the sample that
reflect (a) Industry-GPs-fund characteristics, (b) sample covariance of unpredicted portion of stopping-
time and Rush, and (c) random shocks drawn from a random mixture of normal distributions.
1The sample industry-vintage universe is rather sparse before 1990 (relatively few funds to begin with) and
post 2003 (as relatively few funds reach the stopping-time threshold). Whenever the industry-vintage bucket
includes fewer than nine funds, I (i) consolidate “Energy” and “Materials” into “Industrials”, “Consumer Staples”
into ”Consumer Discretionary” and (if still fewer than nine funds) (ii) consolidate vintages into triennial groups
to allow for better estimations precision.
2Namely, when a fund reaches 15% and 20% threshold of residual NAV to total distributions-to-date is differ-
ent
3See also a discussion in Section 4.
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Applying actual inception dates, for each fund-threshold-placebo exit I obtain the corresponding
stopping-months and match 12-month forward mean Industry Return as well as the respective month
and industry-month covariates that control for Pseudo-timing alternative.4 The data end in October
2013, with the last actual fund stopping-month being March 2013. If the stopping-month is later than
June 2013, this placebo exit is truncated so that the forward mean return is computed over at least 4
months. Hence, some of the funds post 2003 vintage will tend to have notably fewer than 100 placebo
exits.5
The log (inverse-probit) transformation in the first step insures that simulated stopping-times (Rush)
are all positive (between 0 and 1). Although consistency of the third step will not depend on whether
the distribution of actual stopping-times and Rush are close to the simulated ones, it is useful to examine
this question as it may affect inference. Figure A.6 reports comparisons of univariate distributions and
bivariate relations of actual stopping-times and Rush (Actual Funds) vis-a-vis those of placebo exits
(Simulated Funds) for a simulated sample. It appears that simulated bivariate distributions tend to have
more weight in tails which is unlikely to bias-down the parameter variance estimates.
Third, I compare how subsequent Industry Returns associate with Rush of actual funds of interest
(denoted by Treated-dummy) as opposed to that in placebo exits corresponding to these funds via Model
4.1 (main model):
E[IndustryReturnij,1:12] = βTreatedijRushij + γ1Treatedij + γ2Rushij + aj .
The panel subscript j denotes a given actual fund (Treatedij = 1) and the placebo exits(Treatedij = 0)
corresponding to this fund. In Section 5.5.2 I study different groups of actual funds, subsetting the
control group accordingly each time (rather than re-simulating it). In this section, I will focus on the
funds that as of the actual stopping-time had positive timing track record (TTR > 1, Section 3) and
IRR > HurdleRate. Specifically, I will examine statistical properties of the main coefficient of
interest, β.
To insure that β estimates are robust to the simulation starting point (seed value) and yet to keep
the procedure computationally attractive, I repeat the second and third steps 1,000 times. Each time I
4CAY-ratio, VIX, U.S. Treasury yields, corporate credit spreads, the industry index price-earnings and book-
to-market ratios. See Section 2 for details and summary statistics.
5The results are robust to dropping these funds (untabulated).
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randomly choose simulation seeds for shocks and the covariance matrix draws which also alleviates the
autocorrelation problem in pseudo-random number generators. Hence, I obtain independent estimates
of Model (4.1) over 1,000 samples of identical data for actual funds augmented with different simulated
pseudo exits (henceforth independent simulation).
The estimates (confidence intervals) for β that I report in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 in the main text and
in Figures A.7 and A.8A are (based on) equally weighted means of βs (avar(β)s) over these 1,000
independent simulation.6 In essence, I run Fama-Macbeth (1973) procedure which is asymptotically
equivalent and typically as efficient as panel Least-Squares methods.7. While the aggregation of point
estimates is standard, my choice for the variance reflects the fact that β-estimates across our independent
simulation must be perfectly correlated asymptotically.8,9
Besides β and the asymptotic variance-based confidence interval, Figure A.7 plots the range for βs
across independent simulation. This range indicates how sensitive the estimates are to the seed value
choice when we draw at most 100 random exits for each fund. In both Panels, A and B, top-left(right)
charts report results for the baseline model with stopping-time defined as crossing 15 (20)% threshold
of NAV/(total distributions to-date), while bottom-left (right) - for the baseline model augmented with
Pseudo-timing controls and 15 (20)% threshold. Panel A investigates how robust the estimates are to
exclusion of selected vintage years. Panel B – dummies-out selected exit years.
Figure A.3 plots Industry return ranges by exit year (Panel A) and by-vintage distribution of funds
with TTR > 1 (Panel B). It motivates a question if our timing skill estimates might be solely driven by a
few clusters of funds or exits. In each chart/panel of A.7, Case 1 corresponds to the baseline estimates of
β (as reported in Table 5.2B). Cases 2 through 10 in Panel A exclude the following (groups of) vintage
years:
• 1993
6Each avar(β)s estimate is robust to error clustering at exit quarter.
7See Skoulakis (2008)
8A GLS version of Ferson and Harvey (1999) yields almost identical point estimates in the cases I reviewed
(untabulated).
9This variance estimator can also be viewed as obtained through a parametric bootstrap, e.g. see Efron and
Tibshirani (1994).
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• 1992
• 1990
• 2001
• 1993&1992
• 1990&2001
• 1990&1993&2001
• 1990&1992&2001
• 1990&1992&1993&2001
In Panel B, cases 2 through 10 add the following year dummies:
• 2007
• 1999
• 2000
• 2008
• 2007&1999
• 2000&2008
• 2000&2007
• 2000&2007&1999
• 2000&2007&2008
• 2000&2007&1999&2008
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The estimates are virtually unchanged across all cases in both panels. Hence, the results are not driven
by a few calendar clusters.
Next, in Figure A.8 Panel A I examine how the predictability changes when I assign non-native
Industry returns. For each month I compute 5-year rolling pairwise correlations for 10 GICS sectors
portfolios so that for each fund-month the Industry portfolios are ranked by correlation proximity to the
native-industry (Case 1). Clearly, if the effect I estimate has to do with GPs’ expertise, the strongest
predictability should be with respect to the native industry. That is what we observe for both threshold
specifications, 15 and 20% on left and right charts respectively. The coefficients decay towards zero
almost monotonically.
Finally, I seek to address concerns about the parameter-dependence of the null hypothesis that the
estimation features. Panel B of Figure A.8 plot β estimates over independent simulations when actual
fund stopping month and Rush are replaced by their expectations estimated in the first step. These
expected values indicate the location of the density masses for the simulated funds. Clearly, they are
always zero statistically and, if anything, tend to be slightly negative – just as our estimates for actual
fund stopping month and Rush. As with expected stopping month and Rush, I can compute coefficient
and variance estimates for each one of the 100 bivariate draws. Panel C plots the fraction of simulated
funds that have t-statistic lower than that of the actual funds by each independent simulation. We can
see that these random rejection rates are consistent with (two-sided) 5% confidence level for the 15%
threshold case as per asymptotic variance estimates in Table 5.2B, but somewhat higher for the 20%
threshold case where with asymptotic variance estimate we can reject at 10% level.
There is not much subjectivism with the simulation framework I propose. Once could have simply
taken covariance matrix of stopping-times and Rush (rather than residuals) to parametrize the simula-
tions and end-up having near-uniform bivariate distribution which would make aj fixed effects pointless
(beyond controlling for the fund inception date). The only way one can shrink this covariance matrix
is by including relevant covariates that nonetheless leave enough within-variation to identify the coeffi-
cients of interest in the main model. By the same line of arguments, it is not that important whether we
neglect possible endogenity in the auxiliary model since the covariance of residuals shall pick it up.
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The suggested estimation approach is highly attractive computationally and immediately yields con-
venient model diagnostics and null hypothesis verification tools. They all suggest good finite sample
properties of the β and var(β) estimates reported in Section 5.5.2 of the main text.
A.2.2 Alternative Approaches
Another viable econometric strategy to compare market returns following actual fund exits and rush
from those under a random exit assumption would borrow tools from the survival analysis. In fact, a
discrete time hazard-rate model would imply a very similar dataset (spanning the plausible range of
stopping-times for each fund) to the one I use to estimate the main model but the observation weights
would be governed by a parametric distribution (i.e. logistic) instead of a mixture of normals that my
simulations imply. Even though the interpretation of coefficients would be less intuitive as in Model 4.1,
it may be worth close consideration given its wide usage and well developed asymptotic properties.10
However, neither is such a discrete hazard-rate model more robust to functional form misspecifi-
cation or variables omissions, nor is it less restrictive as it comes to the parameter variance estimation.
Moreover, non-linear MLEs are prone to the incidental parameter problem with large set of fixed effects
(unlike OLS that I run).11 Finally, by-passing an auxiliary model of my approach would not be pos-
sible with a hazard-rate model still, because even the values of hypothetical Rush are not known even
for the stopping-times that do not exceed the actual.12 The discussion in Section 4.4.2 suggests a high
importance of the variation in Rush for timing signal extraction and so do the findings in Robinson and
Sensoy (2011, 2013).
10The dummy Treated and mean Industry Return would have to switch sides since the dependent variable needs
to be binary.
11For example, see Wooldrich (2002).
12Essentially, for each quarter we observe a rolling window sum of distributions to the total sum of distribu-
tions to-date, conditional the actual “stopping quarter”. What we need to observe is that amount conditional on
“stopping” in that particular quarter.
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Figure A.6: Actual Exits versus Simulated
This figure reports comparisons of stopping-times (Effective Life) and fractions of distributions over 6 quarters
preceding it in the fund total distributions to-date (Rush-to-Exit) for actual and simulated exits. The simulation
proceeds as follows. I draw a sample of 100 random bivariate normal shocks from a covariance matrix that is
itself randomly drawn each time from Wishart distribution parametrized by the the covariance matrix of residual
ln(stopping − time) and Φ−1(Rush) from the fund fixed effect model reported in Table A.3. The sample
correlation between the residuals is -0.19. The same shocks are merged to each fund-threshold in the sample.
Adding fund specific estimates of expected ln(stopping − time) and Φ−1(Rush) and reverting the functional
transformations, I obtain simulated (i.e. placebo) values of stopping-time and Rush for each fund in the sample
that reflect (a) Industry-GPs-fund characteristics, (b) sample covariance of unpredicted portion of stopping-time
and Rush, and (c) random shocks drawn from a random mixture of normal distributions. Panel A reports kernel
density estimates of Effective Life (left-hand chart) and Rush-to-Exit with solid (dashed) line being a separate
estimate over the actual (simulated) values. Panel B plots local polynomial regressions estimates of Effective Life
and Rush-to-Exit relations for actual and simulated values on the left- and right-hand charts respectively.
Panel A: Univariate Distributions
Panel B: Bivariate Relations
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Figure A.7: Robustness
This figure reports robustness tests for the simulation-based estimates of predictive regressions of Industry returns
by Rush reported in Table 5.2A. Top-left (right) and bottom-left (right) correspond to specifications 1 (2) and 3 (4)
respectively. In both panels, Case 1 corresponds to the baseline estimates of β tabulated in 5.2A. The solid black
line is the mean coefficient value across 1,000 independent simulations, while the area denotes the range of the
values. The 95% confidence interval is based on a mean of asymptotic variance estimates across the simulations.
For Cases 2 through 10, Panel A reports estimates for the same model but the following fund vintage year being
excluded from the estimation: ’93 – ’92 – ’90 – ’01 – ’93’92 – ’90’01 – ’90’93’01 – ’90’92’01 – ’90’92’93’01.
While in Panel B, Cases 2 through 10 include all vintages but augment the model with a dummy denoting the
actual fund stopping-quarters falling in the following years: ’07 – ’09 – ’00 – ’08 – ’07’09 – ’00’08 – ’00’07 –
’00’07’09 – ’00’07’08 – ’00’07’09’08.
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Figure A.8: Placebo Tests
This figure reports placebo tests for the simulation-based estimates of predictive regressions of Industry returns
by Rush reported in Table 5.2A. Left (right)-hand charts correspond to specification 3(4). Case 1 of Panel A
corresponds to the baseline estimates of β tabulated in 5.2A. Cases 2 though 10 replace the fund native GICS
industry sector returns, as measured by S&P500 subindex, with those of the correlation proximity-ranked sector
so that 10 corresponds to the sector with the lowest correlation of monthly returns over the 5-year rolling window
as of the actual stopping-quarters. The solid black line is the mean coefficient value across 1,000 independent
simulations, while the area denotes the range of the values. The 95% confidence interval is based on a mean of
asymptotic variance estimates across the simulations. Panel B plots β estimates and 95% confidence intervals over
these independent simulations if the actual funds stopping-times and distributions were replaced by the expected
ones from the fund fixed effect model reported in Table A.3. Panel C plots the fraction of placebo exits that have
t-statistic lower than that of the actual funds by each independent simulation (100 bivariate draws) as well as the
mean value across them. See A.2 text for a discussion.
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